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of the working class and its relationship to the political parties that typi-
cally provide its democratic representation. In her clearly-written, appeal-
ingly concise and none the less nuanced study of six countries over four
decades Line Rennwald considers how best to understand the contem-
porary multi-faceted working class and the strategies of social democratic
parties. She elaborates on the insights of the notion of class developed by
Daniel Oesch and on the benefits for representation of seeing a working
class that stretches beyond traditional manual workers and includes areas
of the growing service sector. In the face of rising working class support
for parties on the radical right in recent years, Rennwald argues that a
broad working class alliance with social democratic parties that have inte-
grated socio-economic and cultural programmes can instead provide a
more appealing and effective role for the working class in contemporary
politics.”
—Geoffrey Evans, University of Oxford, UK
“If you have ever wondered why social democracy has lost working-
class support, look no further than this book: Line Rennwald delves
into four decades of electoral surveys and shows the reasons behind this
dealignment. A tour de force of political analysis.”




Social Democratic Parties as Children of the Industrial
Revolution 2
Re-Examining the Class Base of the Electorate for Social
Democracy 5
Social Democracy in Crisis: Adding a Piece to the Puzzle
of Understanding a Complex Transformation 7
Plan of the Book 9
References 11
2 A Reflection on Classes; a Reflection on Parties 15
Taking Sociology Seriously: Social Class to Capture
Important Differences in the Labour Market 16
Taking Politics Seriously: The Role of Political Parties
in Class Mobilisation 18
Taking History Seriously: Social Democracy as a Workers’
Party, But Not Only as Such 21
A Note: A ‘Working-Class Party’ Is More Than
a Working-Class Electorate 24
Using the Oesch Class Schema to Study the Transformation




3 Were Social Democratic Parties Really More Working
Class in the Past? 33
Conceptualising the Relationship Between Social Democracy
and Social Classes 34
Social Democracy as Hybrid Working-Class Parties
in the 1970s 38
Dominance Over the Working-Class Vote 44
Summing Up 46
References 47
4 The Class Basis of Social Democracy at the Beginning
of the Twenty-First Century 51
Small and Large Breaks with the Working Class 51
The New Fragmentation of the Working-Class Vote 58
Mobilising the Working Class and Allied Classes 63
Summing Up 65
References 67
5 Parties’ Changing Political Projects and Workers’
Political Attitudes 71
Bringing Parties Back In 72
Between Pro-redistributive and Anti-immigration Worker
Preferences in the 1970s 75
Continuity in Class Preferences in the 2010s 80
Summing Up 84
References 85
6 Renewing Social Democracy by Re-mobilising
the Working Class? 89
Fragmentation in the Working-Class Vote
and the De-proletarianisation of Social Democracy 89
Continuity in Preferences; Changes in Parties’ Political
Offers 92
Should Workers Be Mobilised at All? 94






AfD Alternative for Germany
CDA Christian Democratic Appeal
CDU Christian Democratic Union
CVP Christian Democratic People’s Party
FDP Radical Democratic Party
FN National Front
FPÖ Freedom Party of Austria
ÖVP Austrian People’s Party
PS French Socialist Party
PvdA Dutch Labour Party
PVV Party for Freedom
SP Socialist Party
SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany
SPÖ Social Democratic Party of Austria
SPS Social Democratic Party of Switzerland
SVP Swiss People’s Party
UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party
VVD People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy
xiii
List of Figures
Fig. 3.1 Types of parties according to their support from the
working class and allied classes 35
Fig. 3.2 Support for social democratic parties by social class in six
countries in the 1970s 39
Fig. 4.1 Support for social democratic parties in 2010–2015 in six
countries by social class 54
Fig. 4.2 Choices of abstention and voting for major parties (in
%) among production workers and average citizens,
2010–2015 62
Fig. 5.1 Average position of selected classes on the
pro-redistribution scale—1970s 76
Fig. 5.2 Average position of selected classes on the anti-immigration
scale—1970s 78
Fig. 5.3 Support for anti-immigration initiatives in
Switzerland—1970s 79
Fig. 5.4 Average position of selected classes on the
pro-redistribution scale—2010–2015 81




Table 2.1 Oesch’s 8-class schema with representative occupations
and the average size of classes in the 1970s and in
2010–2015 26
Table 3.1 Participation by social class in the 1970s (in %) 41
Table 3.2 Composition of social democratic party electorates and
total electorates in the 1970s (in %) 42
Table 4.1 Participation by social class in 2010–2015 (in %) 53
Table 4.2 Composition of social democratic party electorates and
total electorates in 2010–2015 (in %) 56
Table 4.3 Competitors for production workers’ votes, 2010–2015 58
Table 4.4 Mobilisation of production workers 63
Table 4.5 Mobilisation of allied classes 64





Abstract Against the backdrop of renewed attention to the working-class
vote in both the scientific community and the political sphere, the ambi-
tion of this book is to provide a careful examination of the relationship
between social democracy and its working-class electorate. The introduc-
tion first presents the context and the goals of the study. It then explains
the conditions required for a detailed and precise analysis of the class basis
of social democracy and outlines the approach used throughout the book.
It also reminds the reader of the origins of social democracy and the broad
transformation and crisis in this party family. It finally presents the choice
of the six social democratic/labour/socialist parties at the centre of this
research.
Keywords Social democracy · Labour movement · Elections · Social
classes · Working-class vote
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Social Democratic Parties as Children
of the Industrial Revolution
This book tells the story of transformations in the electorate for social
democracy and of class conflict in electoral politics in Western Europe.
The relationship between social democratic/socialist/labour parties1 and
their working-class electorates today no longer appears logical and
straightforward. Something has been broken. For a long time, the defence
of the working class constituted the raison d’être of social democratic
parties. They emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and the begin-
ning of the twentieth century as children of the revolutionary processes
of industrialisation and democratisation. They were closely linked to
trade unions—the same individuals were often leading activists in both
parties and unions. While trade unions, as the economic arm of the
labour movement, defended workers’ interests in relation to the power
of employers in factories, social democratic parties stood for workers’
demands in the political sphere. On the one hand, labour movement
organisations were the product of increasing social tensions that emerged
from the industrial revolution. On the other hand, they also decisively
shaped workers’ class consciousness and contributed to them organising
collectively (Moschonas 2002: 28–30; Sassoon 1996: 7–8). In no other
continent has manufacturing employment been as dominant as in Europe
(Therborn 1995). This unique configuration created specific linkages
between parties and social classes and resulted in the importance of a
class cleavage in European politics (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).
Nowadays, the fight for workers’ interests and the definition of the
working class as the natural constituency of social democracy seems to
belong more to history books than to reflect practices in contemporary
politics. Declining support among workers, a declining number of politi-
cians with a working-class background, difficult relationships with trade
unions; all these signals point in the same direction of a massive trans-
formation in social democracy in recent decades. In this context, it is
emblematic that politicians and leaders from social democratic parties
often have trouble in simply addressing the working class. An episode
from the electoral campaign for the 2002 French Presidential election
illustrates the new relationship between social democracy and its histor-
ical constituency well. ‘The word “worker” is not a dirty word,’2 said
the French socialist Pierre Mauroy—an important figure in the French
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Socialist Party who was Prime Minister from 1981 to 1984 under the
Mitterrand Presidency. In this statement, Pierre Mauroy advised Lionel
Jospin, the candidate for the French Socialist Party, to campaign more
explicitly for workers’ interests—at a time where several industrial compa-
nies had announced massive restructuring—and criticised the absence of
the word ‘worker’ from the PS election manifesto. This election was
marked by a very low score for Lionel Jospin, which resulted in his exclu-
sion from the second round. In contrast, the candidate for the National
Front, Jean-Marie Le Pen, succeeded in qualifying for the second round.
In his speech in the evening after the first round, Le Pen presented himself
as the representative of the ‘little people, the nobodies, the excluded’ and
the ‘miners, steelworkers and workers in all these industries ruined by
the “Euro-mondialism” of Maastricht’ and called on them to keep their
hopes and mobilise for the second round.3 Undeniably, it was a strategic
attempt to exploit the lack of appeals to workers by the socialist candidate.
We are now almost twenty years after this election. However, this
episode seems to be the prelude to many similar stories where on the
one hand social democracy has trouble in mobilising the working-class
vote, while on the other hand radical right or even mainstream right
parties present themselves as the true representatives of the ‘people.’
Several earthquakes have happened in recent years. In the 2019 British
general election, the Conservative candidate Boris Johnson won a large
majority—reaching scores unprecedented since Margaret Thatcher—and
managed to gain constituencies held by the Labour Party for decades
in the Midlands and northern England. In the 2016 US presidential
election,4 the victorious Republican candidate Donald Trump decisively
won several states in the Rust Belt—the former manufacturing centre
of the country. His gains in this region were particularly noteworthy in
states such as Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, which had contin-
ually chosen Democratic candidates at each election since 1992. When
there are referendums on European integration—and the 2016 Brexit
referendum is the most recent prominent example—opposition to the
European Union is often strong in former manufacturing areas where
left-wing parties have been historically successful.
Nowadays, on the evening after each election, pundits comment on
the working-class vote and gains by right-wing parties among workers.
At the centre of attention are also the potential strategies of left-wing
parties to again win the workers’ vote. There is therefore an interesting
and somewhat paradoxical return of the working class in the media. In
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recent decades, social classes have become increasingly absent from public
discourse. Evans and Tilley (2017) document the impressive decline of
class in both media and party messages in Great Britain in the period
from 1945 to 2015. Having coded the editorials of three newspapers
(the Mirror, the Guardian and the Times) in each election campaign, they
observe a strong drop in mentions of class after 1997. References to the
‘working class’ have also largely disappeared over time (already in the
mid-1960s and then again in the late 1980s). In contrast, newspapers
have more often used the categories ‘middle’ and ‘upper’ classes since the
mid-1980s. Changes in the media to some extent echo transformations in
the parties’ rhetoric. In the decades following the war, references to the
working class were frequent in the Labour Party’s manifestos and leaders’
speeches at the annual party conferences. From the late 1980s onwards,
the authors detect a strong decrease in mentions of the working class by
the Labour Party.
Today, no one would contest the view that the close ties between the
working class and social democratic parties have loosened. Despite this
widespread impression of change, few studies propose a detailed empir-
ical investigation of this phenomenon. The present book aims to fill this
gap. More precisely, it has three goals. First and foremost, it aims to
paint a nuanced picture of the transformation of the class basis of social
democracy in a comparative perspective. Second, it aims to explore the
mechanisms behind the weakening of the linkage between social democ-
racy and workers. Third, the book also looks forward and discusses some
new paths for the future of social democracy.
The transformation of the working-class vote has generated much
discussion within social democratic parties, with much attention given
to the topic of migration (see Mudde 2019). If social democracy has
lost working-class support to the radical right, should it then endorse a
more restrictive migration policy? In contrast, would it be easier to target
middle-class voters who share a more liberal position on immigration?
In the end, why should social democratic parties bother with their former
working-class electorate if mainly middle-class voters support them? Social
democracy currently faces significant electoral and ideological dilemmas.
In this context, the book contributes by shedding light on the risks and
opportunities of future strategies. Most importantly, it emphasises a need
to precisely analyse the transformations in the working-class vote and
the class profile of social democracy. Any thinking about the future of
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social democracy should start with a rigorous understanding of what has
happened to the electoral base of social democracy in recent decades.
Re-Examining the Class Base
of the Electorate for Social Democracy
I argue in this book that examination of the relationship between social
democracy as a party family and the working class can benefit from three
moves. First, I plead for a rethink of the definition and the bound-
aries of the working class using a class schema—the Oesch class schema
(Oesch 2006)—which is sufficiently precise but at the same time flex-
ible. In particular, it allows the growth of the new ‘service proletariat’
and the diversity of the salaried middle classes to be captured. Second,
I propose that we should think more carefully about the definition of a
working-class party in electoral sociology. Informed by historical contri-
butions, I argue that a primary goal of social democracy has been a search
for alliances. Being a working-class party does not per se exclude the
mobilisation of other allied classes. Third, I argue that mobilisation by
members of the political elite plays a crucial role in the transformation
of the class base of social democracy. Ideological changes in the policy
positions of social democratic parties and the way they have addressed
voters have profoundly altered working-class mobilisation. Moreover, the
rise of populist radical right parties has made issues of national identity
and immigration more salient on the political agenda, with class-based
mobilisation of workers becoming more difficult for social democratic
parties.
Through these moves, I can add clarity and precision to the debate
on the relationship between social democracy and the working-class elec-
torate. Recent comparative contributions have been very informative on
the loosening of the ties between social democracy and workers (see Best
2011; Gingrich and Häusermann 2015; Knutsen 2006; Moschonas 2002)
but they have mostly relied on the classical division between manual
workers (or the working class) and non-manual workers (or the middle
class). They therefore face some difficulties in giving a precise evaluation
of the changes in the class profile of social democracy and in assessing
the new relationship with the heterogeneous non-manual segments of the
electorate. This leads to a slight tendency to understand any evolution of
social democracy as being a move from a working-class to a middle-class
party. By using a sophisticated class schema and elaborating on different
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types of electoral coalitions, I will present a more nuanced and diversified
trajectory of social democracy.
A focus on a ‘mainstream’ party family is relevant in the light of the
growing literature on ‘niche’ or ‘challenger’ parties and especially populist
radical right parties. While the sociology of radical right voting has
emphasised growing support among working-class voters (e.g. Arzheimer
2013; Oesch 2008; Rydgren 2013), we know relatively little about what
has become of social democracy today. Deductions about the changing
character of social democracy are often made in studies focused on the
radical right without a careful examination of the sociology of social
democracy’s electorate and consideration of its specificities.
As previously mentioned, interest in the working-class vote has made
a big return in the media since the 2016 Brexit referendum and the
US election. The focus on the working class has sometimes been so
intense that pundits have neglected the importance of middle- and high-
income voters in these electoral outcomes (for a critical discussion on
the American context, see Carnes and Lupu 2017). Above all, discus-
sion has demonstrated a need for more scientific contributions on the
working-class vote. Public debate has revealed significant weaknesses in
the understanding of social class. First, definitions of the working class
have often been imprecise. In some cases, small business owners—who
have always had a predominantly conservative political orientation—have
been conflated with the working class. In the American context, much
of the public discussion has relied on exit polls, with social class being
measured in terms of income or education, thus ignoring the long Euro-
pean tradition of occupation-based measures. Second, discussion around
these events has revealed that old stereotypes regarding the working
class have not disappeared but instead have become more prevalent and
tended to become dominant. In particular, there is an increasingly current
association of the working class with anger, violence and even stupidity
(see Jones 2012 on the stigmatisation of the working class). In public
discourse, ‘working class’ is increasingly becoming a synonym of what
Marx called the ‘Lumpenproletariat ’—a declassed group at the bottom
of society (including thieves and beggars) that he clearly distinguished
from the working class. The image of the proud class-conscious worker
seems to definitively belong in the cemetery, or else is simply included in
a broad conception of the ‘middle class.’ Third, the concept of working
class in public discourse is increasingly associated with race—one speaks of
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‘white’ working-class voters. Public discourse is contributing to a redefi-
nition of social class as a cultural identity rather than an economic one, a
redefinition influenced by American conservative circles (Peck 2019).5
Social Democracy in Crisis: Adding
a Piece to the Puzzle of Understanding
a Complex Transformation
This book claims that a better understanding of the class base of social
democracy and of changes in it adds an important piece to the complex
puzzle of the transformation of this party family. Since the 1980s, social
democracy has been confronted with multiple challenges. The rise of
neoliberalism, the end of the Cold War and economic globalisation
have deeply shaken the social and ideological foundations of this party
family (Cronin et al. 2011; Sassoon 1996). Moreover, changes in polit-
ical economies have not only involved a sharp decline in manufacturing
employment but also in the factors (e.g. plant size) that previously
facilitated the collective organisation of workers (Pontusson 1995).
Social democracy (and also parties of the moderate right) has experi-
enced a process of electoral decline in western Europe in recent decades
(Martin 2018). This party family has lost vote shares in almost every
European country since the 1990s (Rennwald and Pontusson 2020). It
is nowadays common for social democracy to face new competition for
its core voters from both the left and right of the political spectrum
(Karreth et al. 2013). Previously, competition for the working-class vote
was mainly limited to countries or regions with communist parties or
Christian Democratic parties with a strong labour wing.
Traditionally, social democracy has fulfilled specific functions in the
political system by giving voice and representation to disadvantaged socio-
economic groups. Redirecting attention to the role of this party family
therefore serves our understanding of the crisis in political representa-
tion, and especially of the disconnection of specific social groups from
the political system. Moreover, this book provides insights into the shape
and intensity of class conflict. The mobilisation of the working class by
social democracy reinforced labour interests and brought class conflict
to the centre of politics. At the same time, it also contributed to the
pacification of class conflict and its integration into democratic politics—
scholars conceive class voting as a ‘democratic class struggle’ (Korpi 1983;
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Lipset 1960). Therefore, the break in this class-party alignment suggests
that class conflict might occur in a cruder and more violent way outside
democratic politics and/or become more unbalanced by leaving collective
mobilisation solely to the rich (Gilens 2012; Hacker and Pierson 2010).
Furthermore, the political mobilisation of the working class is crucial
for various welfare state outcomes. According to the power resources
theory (e.g. Korpi 1983, 1989)—an important explanation for cross-
national variation in welfare state development—democratic politics
provides workers with the opportunity to use their right to vote and right
to organise in trade unions. If workers can use these political resources,
they are able to compensate for their lack of power in the market sphere
and can therefore reinforce labour interests relatively to capital inter-
ests. There is therefore a strong correspondence between the strength
of the welfare state and the capacity of workers to organise as a class.
In a kind of virtuous circle, working-class mobilisation reinforces the
welfare state and the welfare state sustains workers’ independency towards
market forces (and at the same time their political rights). The changes
in the working-class vote that are analysed in this book indicate there-
fore a major transformation of the political forces advocating strong social
policies. By extension, the rise of neoliberal politics render workers more
vulnerable and less likely to use their rights in democratic politics, which
again reinforces the dominance of market forces.
This book focuses on six western European countries (Austria, France,
Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Switzerland) in which
a social democratic (also called socialist or labour, depending on the
country) party of importance is present. A decline in manufacturing
employment over recent decades is a pervasive trend across all these
countries. The decreasing weight of the industrial working class in the
electorate therefore poses similar challenges to the social democratic
parties. However, these parties have distinct histories and have evolved
in different party systems. Political differences provide parties with incen-
tives to turn to new segments of the electorate and to appeal to their
voters in specific ways.
The German Social Democratic Party (SPD), the British Labour Party
and the French Socialist Party (PS) have been leading representatives of
the social democratic party family in Europe. However, they have distinct
historical origins, different relationships to trade unions and rely on
different ideological traditions. The French case is also particular because
the Socialist Party was in fierce competition with the Communist Party
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in the post-war decades. The Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) and the Swiss
Social Democratic Party (SPS) represent minor players in the international
Socialist Party family. Although they are among the strongest parties in
the context of their fragmented party systems, they have never been able
to reach a majority either by themselves or by forming a coalition with
smaller left and centre-left parties. By contrast, the Austrian Social Demo-
cratic Party (SPÖ) has reached strong levels of votes, being helped by the
bipartisan tendency of the Austrian party system.6
Plan of the Book
Chapter 2 proposes a reflection on classes, on parties and on the rela-
tionship between the two. It clarifies the concept of social class used
throughout the book and also stresses the need to complement socio-
logical approaches with political approaches. Individuals are more likely
to rely on their social class to form political preferences when political
actors engage in class-based mobilisation. The chapter then discusses the
contours of a ‘working-class party.’ Building on historical contributions, it
emphasises the continual attempts by social democracy to look for support
among allied classes. The chapter closes with a description of the Oesch
class schema, which allows study of social democracy’s electorate with
precision and flexibility.
Chapter 3 further discusses the concept of a ‘working-class party’ and
proposes a distinction between four types of social democratic electoral
coalitions. The chapter then turns to an analysis of the class basis of
social democracy. The goal is to provide a baseline for the strength of
social democracy’s working-class character in the decades following the
Second World War. The demonstration focuses on the 1970s, a period in
which manufacturing employment was still dominant. The analysis finds
a strong working-class basis of social democracy in this period, and also
an intermediate level of support among various classes.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to an empirical analysis of the class basis of
social democracy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It shows a
strong tendency of social democratic parties towards becoming ‘cross-
class parties,’ mobilising no specific social class in particular. Despite
a widespread assumption, only a minority of social democratic parties
have become ‘new class parties’ strongly mobilising specific segments
of the salaried middle classes. The chapter also demonstrates that the
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working-class vote has become much more fragmented. Social democ-
racy now competes with radical left parties, populist radical right parties
and abstention for the working-class vote.
Chapter 5 reviews possible explanations of workers’ new voting
patterns. In a first step, it reviews the changes that social democracy
has opted for in recent decades: on the one hand, it has de-mobilised
workers on the socio-economic dimension; on the other hand, it has
increased the saliency of the socio-cultural dimension. The chapter then
examines the political attitudes of workers to redistribution and immigra-
tion. The results indicate an important continuity in the policy preferences
of classes. This suggests that changes in the political supply are critical
to understand the new relationship between social democracy and its
working-class electorate.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes by summarising the main results of the
book. It closes with a discussion on the renewal of social democracy. With
this aim, it evaluates the role of the working class in social democracy’s
future electoral strategies. It discusses the risks for social democracy in
abandoning the workers’ vote and examines some factors that might facil-
itate the electoral mobilisation of workers in the future. It also reviews
current experiences of various social democratic parties and proposals to
reorient their ideology and implement new strategies.
Notes
1. Throughout this book, I use the labels ‘social democracy’ and ‘social demo-
cratic’ to refer to the parties (and the party family) that have historically
adhered to the project for democratic socialism. Note that I use the terms
‘labour,’ ‘socialist’ and ‘social democratic’ interchangeably. I use the term
‘social democratic’ more often as it is more familiar in continental and
northern Europe, where the powerful Social Democratic Party of Germany
(SPD) at the end of the nineteenth century served as a model for the
creation of similar parties in other countries (Sassoon 1996: 9–11).
2. Pierre Mauroy’s statement is quoted in Lefebvre and Sawicki (2006: 233).
Own translation. The complete original statement is the following: ‘Nous
devons parler plus fort aux travailleurs. Lionel, il faut que tu adresses un
message à la France qui travaille. Le mot ‘ouvrier’ n’est pas un gros mot.’
3. Le Pen’s speech is quoted in Gougou (2015: 323). Own translation.
The complete original statement is the following: ‘N’ayez pas peur, chers
compatriotes! Rentrez dans l’espérance! L’événement, c’est le 5 mai. En
attendant, n’ayez pas peur de rêver, vous les petits, les sans-grade, les exclus.
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Ne vous laissez pas enfermer dans les vieilles distinctions de la gauche et de
la droite, vous qui avez supporté depuis vingt ans toutes les erreurs et les
malversations des politiciens. Vous les mineurs, les métallos, les ouvrières
et les ouvriers de toutes ces industries ruinées par l’euro-mondialisme de
Maastricht.’
4. The Democratic Party in the US is not a social democratic party. However,
since the New Deal of the 1930s, American labour has normally perceived
the Democratic Party as its political home.
5. The category of the ‘white’ working class has also made its way into
academic contributions (see, for example, Gest 2016).
6. The vote shares obtained by those parties in parliamentary elections since
1945 are available in the Appendix.
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CHAPTER 2
A Reflection on Classes; a Reflection on Parties
Abstract This chapter proposes a reflection on classes, on parties and on
the relationship between the two. In order to analyse the class basis of
social democracy, the first step is to take sociology seriously. The chal-
lenge is to define social class and work with a class schema that captures
important divisions in the labour market. The second step is to take poli-
tics seriously. Social class becomes a useful category for political analysis
when one includes the crucial role of political actors in class mobilisa-
tion. The third step involves taking history seriously in order to precisely
draw the contours of a working-class party. The challenge is to avoid the
serious pitfalls of over-estimating or under-estimating the working-class
character of social democracy. After having taken these three steps, the
chapter concludes with a description of the Oesch class schema used in
this book.
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Social Class to Capture Important
Differences in the Labour Market
The existence of various definitions of the working class and controver-
sies about the concept of social class itself represent substantial challenges
in an analysis of the class basis of social democracy. Moreover, there is a
tendency among large parts of the scientific community (and also among
the broader public) to reject the concept of social class on the ground
that it belongs to a Marxist framework of analysis—which today is often
rejected in mainstream social science research. Scholars increasingly use
income categories or discuss differences in education levels. However, it
must be clarified that one does not need to be a Marxist to use social
class and to analyse social stratification. Not only Karl Marx but also
his bourgeois critic Max Weber widely used social class in their writings.
Quantitative empirical research is also relatively pragmatic. Erikson and
Goldthorpe (1992: 35ff), who developed one of the most important class
schemata used in empirical research, consider their schema an ‘instrument
de travail ’ and rely on elements from both Marx and Weber. Moreover,
occupation represents a central indicator in all class schemata.
This book chooses to talk about social classes in order to analyse
the relationship between social democracy and workers. In the European
context, the dominance of the industrial sector has created unique config-
urations of linkages between political parties and social classes (Therborn
1995: 68). Parties have developed around specific classes, and not around
specific income groups or education levels (even if the two are, of course,
related). Liberal and conservative parties were created to represent the
interests of the bourgeoisie, and the socialist parties emerged to repre-
sent the interests of the working class in the political arena. Needless to
say, perhaps, a focus on income would ignore one of the most impor-
tant dividing lines in history, the one between workers and employers/the
self-employed.
I belong to a tradition in sociology that stresses the ‘objective’ compo-
nent of social class (class in itself). In practice, it is possible to allocate a
class position to individuals on the basis of their positions in the labour
market and to empirically analyse the effects of inequalities among the
positions of individuals. Class is a way to capture important differences in
material conditions and economic interests. Sociologists have developed
complex class schemata where individuals are allocated a class position
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based on their occupation and their employment status (e.g. Erikson and
Goldthorpe 1992; Oesch 2006). The theoretical bases of class schemata
vary, but common categories include workers, employers and the self-
employed together with finer distinctions within middle-class employees
(managers, professionals, etc.).
Crucially, sociologists can demonstrate that differences among occupa-
tional classes do matter. A class schema—if it correctly captures important
divisions in the labour market—determines a large range of outcomes,
such as the risk of unemployment, income, promotion prospects and
social protection (e.g. Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006; Evans and Mills
2000; Oesch 2006). The crux of this tradition is studying the differ-
ences among ‘occupational’ classes. But are occupational classes really
social classes? Certainly not. They only build the economic basis on top
of which similar interests can be developed. It is certainly more precise
to talk of ‘economic classes’ rather than ‘social classes’, where individuals
also share a collective identity and may ultimately become political actors
(e.g. Kocka 1980).
Class schemata propose a representation of social stratification that go
well beyond the widespread dichotomy between blue-collar and white-
collar occupations. This distinction is above all telling in the context
of a manufacturing company where it differentiates between the shop
floor where production workers are active and the office area where
clerks, technicians and the management work. Outside the manufacturing
world, implementing the dichotomy is less straightforward. The category
of blue-collar workers is strongly associated with factory workers; other
occupations characterised by harsh working conditions such as domestic
service—once a widespread occupation among female workers—are more
difficult to classify. There are also occupations that are neither blue-collar
nor white-collar. One can think, for example, of workers in the transport
sector, for example railway employees or tramway drivers. They do not
perform their work in an office but are also not active in a production
process. Precise definitions are often lacking and render the classifica-
tion of occupations difficult. One should also mention that social security
schemata are based on this dichotomy in some countries—especially in
Germany. Variations in definitions may also reflect the development of
social protection and struggles around it.
Complex class schemata—which require detailed lists of occupations
based on open-format questions—are widespread in the literature. In
political science, their use has been advocated since many years to study
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voting behaviour (e.g. Evans 1999a, 2000). However, it is astonishing
how influential the blue-collar vs. white-collar distinction remains. It is
not unusual for surveys to include closed-format questions where indi-
viduals are asked to place themselves in a categorisation derived from
this dichotomy. Quite common is also to find data where pollsters have
recoded respondents’ occupations into a limited number of categories
based on this distinction. This often occurs in surveys conducted in
German-speaking countries, but it is also the case in some cross-national
surveys (e.g. Eurobarometer surveys). These data render the prospect
of using a sophisticated class schema difficult or imprecise (but see a
careful attempt to construct the Erikson and Goldthorpe class schema
using Eurobarometer data in Knutsen 2006: 17–23).
Taking Politics Seriously: The Role
of Political Parties in Class Mobilisation
If one adopts a sociological perspective, one can analyse the extent to
which classes display homogeneity in their political behaviour. If a class
schema captures pertinent differences among classes, it is quite likely that
classes will display some variation in their political preferences. Voting
behaviour is therefore the product of the social divisions existing in a
society. This approach was emphasised at the macro-level by Lipset and
Rokkan (1967) in their analysis of the formation of party systems. They
stressed that party systems in the 1960s reflected the social divisions at the
time of the development of party systems in the early twentieth century.
At the micro-level, the first explanations of voting behaviour emphasised
the close connection between an individual’s social position and his polit-
ical preferences. Lazarsfeld and his team, who were pioneers in electoral
research, stressed that ‘a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially’ (1944:
27). There is surely some determinism in this approach. Above all, it
leaves little room for political actors or in any case does not primarily
stress the role of politics. In this section, I would like to stress the impor-
tance of political actors who reinforce the salience of social class. We can
only understand the transformation of social democracy if we try to inte-
grate into the framework the extent to which parties mobilise their voters
with a class-based appeal.
Political scientists have brought interesting distinctions to the fore and
have proposed to complement the sociological approach in various ways.
Peter Mair (1999) suggests a useful distinction between ‘class voting’
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and ‘class politics’. He makes this distinction in a volume dedicated
to the study of class voting (Evans 1999b). According to Mair, class
voting is a sociological approach to voting where the goal is to assess
whether classes differ overall in their voting behaviour. The focus lies on
the cohesiveness of classes, but less on the specific parties that classes
choose and the reasons behind these choices. By contrast, class politics
implies entering the realm of politics. The term refers more broadly to
the various processes through which parties and interest organisations
translate social conflicts into political conflicts. In order to understand
the links between classes and parties, one needs, therefore, to get a sense
of the representation of class interests by political parties.
The concept of ‘cleavage’ represents a useful tool to make a connec-
tion between sociological and political approaches. Mair again, together
with Bartolini (1990), discusses this concept that links social structure
to political order in detail. According to these authors, a cleavage is
much more than a pure social division (a ‘social cleavage’), which has no
organisation at the political level, or a pure political division (a ‘political
cleavage’), which lacks a connection to the social structure. Bartolini and
Mair articulate three components of a cleavage: (1) an empirical element
that refers to social structure; (2) a normative element that refers to the
values and beliefs shared by a group; (3) an organisational/behavioural
component that refers to the interactions, institutions and organisations
that develop as part of the cleavage (e.g. political parties or trade unions)
(Bartolini and Mair 1990: 215–216). They propose limiting the use of
the cleavage concept to divisions that include these three elements, which
often reinforce each other. A purely socio-structural approach is therefore
not enough to analyse the changes in class-based cleavages that are at the
centre of this book. The research agenda outlined here consists in system-
atically investigating the interaction between social divisions and political
actors.
A similar research agenda can be identified in other contributions.
Przeworski and Sprague (1986) underline the importance of party strate-
gies and actions in voting. They are particularly interested in social class
and the development of class voting. The extent to which social class
constitutes a defining element of voting must be thought of in close
connection with political actors. Political parties are not passive actors
but they actively shape the support they receive among social groups,
according to these authors. The extent to which individuals vote on the
basis of their social class not only depends on class structure but is also the
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result of the actions of political parties. The authors are therefore inter-
ested in social class in relation to the process of class formation (Sainsbury
1990).
The influence of political parties has not been at centre stage in
research for a long time. It was seen as relatively natural that left-
wing parties should articulate class interests. Workers would find a party
supporting (at least to some extent) working-class interests in the polit-
ical sphere. The idea that parties mobilise class was somehow implicit in
the literature dedicated to class voting. However, the significant ideo-
logical mutations of social democracy over recent decades have shown
that class-based appeal from the left cannot be taken for granted. When
scholars started to engage in more depth with explanations of the decline
in class-based voting behaviour, explanations involving political parties
gained attraction (see Elff 2009).
The most recent attempt to think carefully about the role of political
actors in class voting can be found in a book edited by Evans and De
Graaf (2013). The authors propose a distinction between ‘bottom-up’
and ‘top-down’ explanations of the decline in class voting. The under-
lying idea of the ‘bottom-up’ approach is that if class voting declines it is
because classes have become more heterogeneous as a result of processes
of individualisation and fragmentation. This perspective, which has been
dominant in the literature on the decline in class voting, for the authors
represents only one side of the coin. It is also necessary to take into
account how class differences are articulated by political actors and the
political elite. Changes in class voting can therefore be driven by transfor-
mations of social classes themselves or by transformations of parties and
the political elite who mobilise class differences. When adopting this view,
class voting takes on a new light. Class voting is also likely to increase if
political parties mobilise social classes more explicitly—the trend of class
voting decline can be reversed (see also Evans and Tilley 2012).
An interesting empirical test of this new framework was conducted in
Great Britain.1 Working on a new dataset on the period 1959–2006,
Evans and Tilley (2012) show that most of the decline in class voting
occurs at the end of the period under study. They identify a strong decline
in class differences in the support for the Labour Party since the mid-
1990s. They also observe a considerable decrease in the 1960s and a
smaller one between the 1970s and the beginning of the 1990s. The
authors demonstrate that the growing heterogeneity of social classes (in
terms of education, gender, income, etc.) does not explain their increasing
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proximity in party choice. It is only when the authors include the changes
in the left-right positioning of political parties (and especially the move
to the centre by the Labour Party in the 1990s) that they can explain the
changes in class-party relationships.2
This perspective suggests that social democracy can lose its working-
class support due to political choices. At the same time, the approach
also emphasises the capacity of social democracy to renew its appeal to
its working-class electorate if it adopts a pertinent political strategy. My
emphasis on ‘politics’ in this section reminds us of the capacity of parties
to generate support among specific groups.
Taking History Seriously: Social Democracy
as a Workers’ Party, But Not Only as Such
The literature on class voting focuses on the existence of divisions in
voting behaviour. However, instead of emphasising differences in voting
behaviour between the working class and the middle class, it is possible
to take a different perspective and emphasise proximities between some
‘intermediate’ classes and the working class. This section does not aim
to deny the working-class character of social democracy or to deny the
important differences in voting between social classes. Instead, the aim
is to demonstrate that social democracy has not only sought to attract
industrial workers but has simultaneously sought support among poten-
tially allied groups. The aim is to reconcile the study of class voting with
historical evidence pointing to the existence of complex class coalitions. In
order to do this, one needs to depart from the dominant binary distinc-
tion between white-collar work and blue-collar work that surrounds much
of the literature on social democracy.
From a historical perspective, it would be wrong to understand social
democracy as a purely factory workers’ movement. Certainly, social
democracy benefited from the increasing concentration of the work-
force in larger workplaces—a decisive element in the electoral strength
of socialist parties (see Bartolini 2000; Pontusson 1995)—and the strong
similarity in its working and living conditions in the heyday of industrial-
isation. However, social history accounts draw our attention to a strong
diversity in terms of occupations, skills and origins among workers and
attempts by the labour movement to build unity in this diversity (e.g.
Thompson 1979; Noiriel 1986). In the nineteenth century, craft workers
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played a key role in the development of the labour movement and partic-
ularly in the formation of trade unions (Mommsen and Husung 1985).
There were also intellectuals present in social democratic parties from the
beginning. The leaders of social democratic parties themselves did not
always have a working-class background, but often came from families
from the petty or even the haute bourgeoisie.
It is also clear that several groups of lower-rank white-collar workers,
or workers that were not easily classifiable as blue-collar or white-collar,
already displayed sympathy for social democracy at the onset of the
mobilisation of the labour movement. The proximity between the inter-
ests of factory workers and (often female) lower-level employees tends
to be forgotten in studies that are based on the crude and impre-
cise blue-collar vs. white-collar distinction. Furthermore, public sector
employees and especially workers in public infrastructure and services
(railway workers and post office workers) have been prominent supporters
of social democracy in many countries, notably thanks to a strong union
density. Membership figures indicate an important presence of these
workers and employees in the ranks of social democratic parties (e.g.
Reynard 2013; Sühl 1988; Wicki 2007). Generally, rail unions have played
a significant role in the labour movement and have critically contributed
to the development of social democratic and labour parties in many
countries (see Crompton 2009 on Great Britain; Bauer [1930] 1979 on
Austria).
Furthermore, social democratic parties themselves had the ambition
early on to appeal to other allied classes. In this respect, it is very inter-
esting to read a text by Friedrich Engels from 1895. In the introduction
to Karl Marx’s The Class Struggles in France, Engels ([1895] 1977)
is euphoric, enthusiastic about the strong electoral progression of the
German Social Democratic Party (SPD) following the introduction of
male universal suffrage. He saw the utilisation of universal suffrage by
German workers as an example for the labour movements in other coun-
tries. He also estimated that by the end of the nineteenth century the
SPD would be able to convince large parts of the middle class, including
the petty bourgeoisie and small farmers. Of course, this thesis is strongly
influenced by the idea that large parts of the middle class would become
proletarianised. However, this shows very well the agenda of convincing
segments beyond the industrial working class.
Political science accounts consider the relationship of social democracy
with other potentially allied classes. In the 1960s, Kirchheimer (1966)
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observed the beginning of a radical transformation of social democracy.
He considered the context of the post-war period to have created strong
pressures on the functioning and principles of social democratic parties
(and also of Christian Democratic parties). Trends towards a secularisa-
tion of society, the development of mass consumption and the weakening
of divisions between social classes were leading parties to transform them-
selves into what he termed ‘catch-all “people’s” parties’ (1966: 184).
In his view, this new model of party organisation was supplanting that
of the ‘class-mass integration party’ that had characterised social democ-
racy throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Kirchheimer was
interested not only in the electorate, but more largely in the ideological
and organisational transformations parties were undergoing. Next to a de-
emphasis of the party’s core clientele and a willingness to recruit voters
from all segments of the population, he also analysed the transformation
of social democracy as a weakening of party ideology, a strengthening of
the top leadership, a downgrading of individual membership and access
to various interest groups (Kirchheimer 1966: 20).
Kirchheimer’s analysis is based on observations on several West Euro-
pean countries (including France, Italy and Great Britain), but the
transformation of the German Social Democratic Party probably had an
important influence on the development of the catch-all party thesis (see
also Safran 2009). The SPD adopted a new manifesto in 1959 which
marked a substantial ideological rupture. The Bad Godesberg Programme
was no longer structured along a Marxist view of society and described
the SPD as a people’s party (Volkspartei) and no longer as a class-based
party. Although Kirchheimer does not refer explicitly to the Bad Godes-
berg Programme in his essay, it is clear that the catch-all party thesis must
be thought to be closely connected to it.
From the point of view of the demand side of voters, one can read the
catch-all party model as successful recruitment of voters from all segments
of the population. Instead of being heavily biased towards working-class
voters, ‘catch-all’ social democracy thus represents a sort of mirror of
the entire electorate. However, Kirchheimer’s argument is more nuanced
(Müller 1992: 190–191). Social democratic parties would not seek to
convince all voters, but only those ‘whose interests do not adamantly
conflict’ (Kirchheimer 1966: 186). He mentions the example of white-
collar workers and civil servants, two groups that could be targeted
simultaneously with blue-collar workers without losing credibility. While
Kirchheimer is known for having put forward the concept of the catch-all
24 L. RENNWALD
party, his idea of enlarging the electoral targets of social democracy is still
to some extent compatible with the idea of social democracy as a working-
class movement. Later on, I will advance the term ‘hybrid working-class
party’ to characterise the situation in which social democracy mobilises
the working class and also allied classes.
In their well-known book Paper Stones on the history of electoral
socialism, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) adopt a position diametrically
opposed to that of Kirchheimer. A hybrid working-class party is not
sustainable in the long run. Their argument is that an opening to other
segments transforms the class character of social democracy and marks
an end to its working-class character. More precisely, the two authors
focus on the history of socialist parties. They observe a similar scenario
in every country. Socialist parties grew larger, but their electoral progress
stopped after a certain time. According to these authors, the main reason
is that the expected proletarianisation of large segments of the population
did not happen and workers never became a majority of the electorate.
This element is of central importance in Przeworski and Sprague’s work.
The fact that workers do not constitute more than 50% of the electorate
constrains socialist parties to look for allies outside the working class. This
leads the authors to articulate the existence of an electoral dilemma for
socialist parties. Socialist parties can either remain parties of the working
class without reaching any parliamentary majority or obtain electoral
majorities but with the risk of losing their working-class electorate with an
appeal extended to other classes. Socialist parties as working-class parties
are undeniably condemned to fail: either they remain small or they lose
their working-class character.
A Note: A ‘Working-Class Party’ Is
More Than a Working-Class Electorate
This book focuses on studying the electorate of social democracy. At
this stage, it is essential to note that the idea of a ‘working-class party’
goes well beyond a working-class electorate. Historically, social democ-
racy relies on a close connection among the electorate, the ideology and
the movement. A working-class party means not only a party supported
by workers but also a party that tries to improve the living conditions of
workers. The ultimate goal is to achieve an emancipation of the working
class that abolishes their dependency on the interests of capitalists. More-
over, historical contributions also note the existence of a close connection
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between social democracy and labour unions as part of a larger social
movement, the labour movement.
The analysis in this book is focused primarily on the electorate, but
there is a constant effort to put the transformation of the electorate in
close connection with ideology and labour unions throughout the book.
It is also important to emphasise this element given the new competi-
tion that social democracy faces among workers. From a demand-side
perspective, one can observe that new parties attract votes from workers.
However, if one follows the encompassing definition of a working-class
party, it is difficult to put radical right parties in this category. Following
the criteria of ideology and movement, radical right parties cannot be
described as working-class parties. Their ideology is clearly opposite to
the socialist ideology based on the emancipation of the working class.
They also constantly attack the legitimacy of trade unions (see Mosimann
et al. 2019).
Using the Oesch Class Schema to Study
the Transformation of Social Democracy
It is necessary to have a class schema that is precise enough to capture
the core electorate of social democracy—the industrial working class—
but flexible enough to analyse the creation of various class coalitions that
are likely to change over time. The new class schema developed by Oesch
(2006) perfectly fits these two criteria. It allows a precise operationalisa-
tion of lower non-manual classes and also for diverse segments of the
salaried middle classes to be taken into account—a new and growing
potential for social democracy.
The Oesch class schema represents an alternative to the Erikson and
Goldthorpe (1992) class schema—also known under the abbreviation
EGP—which is predominantly used in the class voting literature. EGP was
conceived for societies in which employment in the manufacturing sector
still constitutes an important share of total employment. By contrast, the
Oesch class schema represents the most ambitious attempt to take into
account changes in employment structure that have occurred in recent
decades, such as the decrease in manual employment and occupational
upgrading.
In a similar vein to the EGP class schema, the Oesch class schema
(represented in Table 2.1) includes a vertical dimension that distinguishes
more or less advantageous positions in the labour market. Additionally,
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Table 2.1 Oesch’s 8-class schema with representative occupations and the
average size of classes in the 1970s and in 2010–2015
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Source Own calculations based on the Political Action Survey and the European Social Survey (see
Chapters 3 and 4 for the detailed sources). Averages for six countries (Austria, France, Germany,
Great Britain, the Netherlands and Switzerland). Based on respondents’ class positions
and this is where it departs most from the EGP class schema, it also
includes a horizontal dimension which is based on different ‘work logics’.
Starting with the importance of daily work experiences in shaping inter-
ests and loyalties, Oesch distinguishes between three different work logics
for employees: the ‘organisational work logic’, the ‘technical work logic’
and the ‘interpersonal work logic’. A fourth work logic, the ‘indepen-
dent work logic’ applies to employers and the self-employed. Within the
salaried middle classes, the horizontal dimension permits a distinction
among managers (included in the ‘organisational work logic’), socio-
cultural professionals (included in the ‘interpersonal work logic’) and
technical professionals (included in the ‘technical work logic’). Managers
are the group that is closest to the interests of employers, while socio-
cultural professionals are the most remote (see Kriesi 1998).
The horizontal distinctions are not limited to the salaried middle classes
but apply to all positions in the labour market. This allows the contours
of the working class to be enlarged to the ‘new proletariat’ in the service
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sector. In this schema, the production workers included in the ‘tech-
nical work logic’ form the core of the manual working class. The service
workers included in the ‘interpersonal work logic’ represent most clearly
the ‘new proletariat’ in the services. An additional category is composed
of office workers, which take the lower positions in the ‘organisational
work logic’. Unlike the EGP class schema, all these classes have a similar
hierarchical position.
The most sophisticated version of the Oesch class schema includes 17
classes that can be merged in order to form more parsimonious class
schemas. In this book, the 8-class version is used, which groups together
the two classes with the lowest skill level and the two classes with the
highest level. This means that unskilled workers are grouped together
with skilled workers (at the bottom) and that associate professionals are
grouped together with professionals (at the top). This merging is useful
from a practical point of view. Since occupational classifications change
over time, it is easier to find conversions when dealing with a smaller
number of categories. Crucially, it is meaningful from a theoretical point
of view. Access to higher education becomes the decisive criteria on the
vertical dimension. The disadvantage of this merging is that class differ-
ences appear to be more flat on the vertical dimension, in comparison
with other class schemata.
Table 2.1 indicates the average size of the eight classes in the 1970s and
the 2000s–2010s in six Western European countries. Production workers
represented almost a third of the population eligible to vote and were by
far the largest group in the 1970s. In the more recent period, they only
form 16% of the population, a proportion equivalent to that of managers
and slightly smaller than that of service workers.
Three variables are needed to construct the Oesch’ class schema
(the 8-class version): occupation; status of employment; and number of
employees, in order to distinguish large employers from small business
owners. Information is derived from the current position of an individual
in the labour market and from the past position if the respondent is retired
or unemployed. Concerning occupation, the schema is based on the Inter-
national Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) developed by the
International Labour Organisation (ILO). More precisely, the schema was
initially developed on the basis of the 1988 classification (ISCO-88) at
its most detailed level (4-digits). It is possible to find translations with
the older version of the classification (ISCO-68) and the newer version
(ISCO-08). These are sometimes present in the surveys used in this book.
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In some cases, instead of the international classification, national classifi-
cations of occupations are available in surveys. Again, it is possible to
translate them into ISCO codes or directly into the eight classes.
Notes
1. Next to the chapters included in the edited volume by Evans and De Graaf
(2013), several other studies have tested some top-down or supply-side
hypotheses (e.g. Arès 2017; Langsæther 2019; Rennwald and Evans 2014;
Vestin 2019).
2. Relatively similar effects on the move to the centre by social democratic
parties can be found in a study by Arndt (2013). The author focuses on
Third Way welfare state reforms conducted by social democratic govern-
ments at the end of the 1990s in four West European countries. He also
demonstrates a negative impact of these reforms on working-class support
in Denmark, Germany and Great Britain.
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CHAPTER 3
Were Social Democratic Parties ReallyMore
Working Class in the Past?
Abstract The goal of this chapter is to establish a baseline for the
strength of the working-class character of social democracy in the decades
following the Second World War in order to avoid any over- or under-
estimation. The chapter develops criteria to analyse the class profile of
social democracy and define a working-class party. The leading idea is that
social democracy as a working-class party does not per se exclude support
from other allied classes. I therefore propose a distinction between hybrid
and pure working-class parties. The chapter demonstrates the relatively
strong working-class character of social democracy in six Western Euro-
pean countries. The analysis focuses on the 1970s because this period still
featured the ‘Keynesian class compromise’ (although it started to be in
serious crisis) and comparative survey data are available.
Keywords Voting · Social democracy · Working class · Working-class
party
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Conceptualising the Relationship Between
Social Democracy and Social Classes
In order to determine the class profile of social democracy, it is necessary
to capture the relation of social democracy to its core electorate of the
working class, as well as to other potentially allied classes. As discussed
in the previous chapter, the search for alliances has been a primary goal
of social democracy. One must therefore consider the possibility that
social democracy as working-class parties1 does not per se exclude the
mobilisation of other classes but is to some extent compatible with the
support of other allied classes. At the same time, the specific relationship
of social democracy to the working class needs to be emphasised, espe-
cially with respect to other parties. If social democracy strongly mobilises
the working-class vote, other parties will have difficulty in benefiting
from the working-class vote. Hence, social democracy as working-class
parties suggests that this party family enjoys a kind of monopoly over the
working-class vote.
I propose to think of four ideal types of social democratic party elec-
torates. They combine the support that social democratic parties receive
from their core electorate of the working class (first dimension) with the
support they receive from allied classes (second dimension). The four
types are schematically represented in Fig. 3.1. They rely on different
combinations of class support: (1) a pure working-class party relies on
strong electoral support from the working class but weak electoral support
from allied classes; (2) a hybrid working-class party relies on strong elec-
toral support from both the working class and allied classes; (3) a new
class party relies on strong electoral support from allied classes but weak
support from the working class; (4) a cross-class party is one with no social
group dominant in its electorate.
The combination of these two dimensions allows conceptualisation of
the electoral basis of social democracy in a finer way than the previous
literature permits. In particular, it makes a more flexible interpretation of
working-class parties possible by recognising social democracy’s continual
search for allies. This is important to establish a baseline for the working-
class character of social democracy as we do in this chapter before turning
to the transformations over time. Introducing the hybrid working-class
party type includes the possibility that social democracy might mobilise
both its core electorate and allied classes. A pure working-class party oper-
ates in a situation in which the voting choice is strongly polarised so social


















Fig. 3.1 Types of parties according to their support from the working class and
allied classes
democracy relies almost entirely on mobilisation of the working class. This
situation excludes cases where social democracy can benefit from even
intermediate support from other allied classes. I therefore expect social
democratic parties in the decades following the war to have been more
often closer to the hybrid type of working-class party than to the pure
type.
Furthermore, the conceptualisation allows a large range of options
in the transformations of the class profile of social democracy to be
taken into account. I propose envisaging two options (see the arrows in
Fig. 3.1), where social democracy becomes cross-class parties with class no
longer relevant in their social base, or it becomes new class parties with
a different class replacing the long-term dominance of the working class.
Several comparative studies have convincingly demonstrated a decline in
manual workers’ support for social democracy (e.g. Best 2011; Gingrich
and Häusermann 2015; Knutsen 2006; Moschonas 2002) but have not
reached a precise conclusion on the new class profile of social democracy.
This is partly due to the classical division between manual workers and
non-manual workers they use. The work conducted by Moschonas (2002:
83–119) illustrates some of the difficulties met well. Based on a careful
compilation of secondary literature, he identifies a reinforcement of a
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second pillar of social democracy voters made up of the salaried middle
classes. According to him, the salaried middle classes have the potential to
become the new ‘centre of the social democratic coalition’ as was previ-
ously the case for the working class (Moschonas 2002: 113). However,
he points to a strong variation in national situations and the important
heterogeneity in the salaried middle classes—an element he cannot fully
examine with the broad groupings of occupations he uses.
Moreover, there is a slight tendency to subsume social democracy’s
contemporary profile under the ‘middle-class parties’ heading, given the
general rise of middle-class occupations relative to blue-collar occupa-
tions in the employment structure. Gingrich and Häusermann (2015)
carefully inspect the decline in the working-class vote from the 1980s to
the 2010s (and as its consequences for the elaboration of social policies).
The authors are able to show a process in which parties of the left2 can
compensate for the decline in working-class support with new support
from middle-class constituencies. Their results for the class composition
of left-wing party supporters indicate that middle-class voters represent an
increasing part of social democracy’s electoral base—and manual workers
a decreasing part. More precisely, they show that since the 1990s middle-
class voters have represented a larger part of the electoral base than
manual workers.3 Their analysis on the transformation of the class compo-
sition is extremely interesting but it does not really take into consideration
changes in class structure. Similar results may be found for all polit-
ical parties given the general decline in blue-collar occupations and the
concomitant rise in middle-class occupations.
What makes a cross-class party distinctive is its absence of support from
specific social classes—but not an absence of support as such. The working
class does not have a dominant position for this type. Support from the
working class is no longer distinct from that from other classes, including
traditionally opposed classes. There is a strong proximity between the
cross-class party type and the catch-all party model (see the previous
chapter). I preferred the label ‘cross-class party’ to the more encom-
passing concept of ‘catch-all party’, which not only refers to the electorate
but also to the ideology of parties. Furthermore, as I argued in the
preceding chapter, the initial idea of the electorate formulated by Kirch-
heimer (1966) refers more to a restrictive opening to other classes than
to a broad opening of socialist parties to all social classes. Hence, Kirch-
heimer’s formulation refers more to the hybrid working-class party type,
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which has a combination of strong support from the working class and
intermediate support from allied classes.
The ‘new class’ type is intimately related to the close proximity between
specific segments of the salaried middle classes and left-wing parties. The
idea of a new class refers to the expansion of the new middle classes in
social structure.4 Several scholars have emphasised the strong left-wing
potential among professionals in social and cultural services, the ‘socio-
cultural professionals’ in the Oesch class schema (e.g. Kitschelt 1994;
Kriesi 1998). Indeed, research has shown differences in party preferences,
with socio-cultural professionals leaning to the left (and especially towards
the Greens) and managers—the salaried arm of owners and employers—
leaning to the right (e.g. Dolezal 2010; Güveli et al. 2007; Müller
1999; Oesch 2008). Hence, in the recent period, the allied classes have
typically included socio-cultural professionals. In previous periods, lower-
rank white-collar workers (service workers and clerks in the Oesch class
schema) formed the backbone of allied classes (see the previous chapter).
Instead of collapsing all white-collar workers into a unique category, the
Oesch class schema allows us to capture these classes with precision while
also offering flexibility to deal with the rise of new allies over time.
What does strong electoral support from a class mean? It is possible
to consider the question from two different angles. First, it is possible
to think about the distinctiveness of a specific social class in its vote
choice. The extent to which a social class gives support to a political party
that is different from the average vote choice indicates a close affinity
between a specific social class and a specific party. This factor has been
at the centre of research on cleavages (and the decline in cleavages),
where attention has been given to the “partisan alignments of specific
groups comprising cleavages” (Brooks et al. 2006: 91). However, schol-
arly research has also pointed to the importance of changes in the size
of the groups comprising cleavages, most notably to the reduction in the
size of the industrial working class. In this perspective, cleavages become
weaker, not only or simply because groups change their political pref-
erences (‘behavioural dealignment’) but simply because they lose their
prominence in the social structure (‘structural dealignment’) (e.g. Best
2011; Goldberg 2017, 2019; Lachat 2007; Manza and Brooks 1999).
One must therefore also consider the electoral relevance of a specific social
class for a party. The extent to which a social class represents a large share
of a party’s voters indicates the dependency of the party on that specific
social class for its electoral results. This factor depends on the size of
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the group in the social structure—it is more likely that a social class is
important to a party’s score if the class represents a strong proportion
of the total potential electorate. It also depends on the specific group’s
turnout—it is more likely that a social class is important to a party’s score
if the class displays a strong turnout.5
In order to tap into the electoral support from social classes, I therefore
propose to use two indicators: the vote of workers (and allied classes) in
relation to the average party score and the contribution of workers (and
allied classes) to the electoral score of social democratic parties in relation
to their weight in the social structure. For each element, I will not only
consider the absolute level of support for social democracy but will also
consider the relative level by means of ratios relating the level of support
from a given class to a party’s average level of support. This will allow
me to take into account variations in parties’ electoral popularity, as is
emphasised in class voting research (Evans 1999: 13–14).
Social Democracy as Hybrid
Working-Class Parties in the 1970s
I focus on one election in the first half of the 1970s and use the cross-
national ‘Political Action: An Eight Nation Study, 1973–1976’ survey.
This survey included a question on the party voted for in the last
national parliamentary election and detailed information on the respon-
dents’ occupations. Since France was not included in this survey, I use
the post-electoral survey for the 1978 legislative election (first round).
Manufacturing was still predominant during the decade in question—
employment in the industrial sector peaked in 1970 in Europe (Therborn
1995: 71) and large demographic earthquakes did not affect the industrial
working class until the 1980s (Hobsbawm 1994). Moreover, in the period
of economic expansion that started after the Second World War and lasted
until the recession of 1973–1975, social democratic parties reached a
peak in terms of ideological influence, public policies and electoral perfor-
mances6 (Escalona 2018: 27). Focusing on the 1970s makes possible to
study the electoral base of social democracy during this successful period.
There are also pragmatic reasons for making a comparison with this
decade. If one puts aside the British case, this is when surveys emerged.
Let us start with the extent to which social democracy reached a high
score among workers. Figure 3.2 displays support for social democratic
parties by social class, with the parties’ average score on the vertical
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a) AT: SPÖ 1971 (mean: 55.9%) b) GB: Labour 1970 (mean: 46.5%)
c) DE: SPD 1971 (mean: 42.9%) d) FR: PS 1978 (mean: 24.9%)







































































































Fig. 3.2 Support for social democratic parties by social class in six countries in
the 1970s
Notes The election year is given in the headings. Numbers of cases: AT: 1018, GB: 682, DE:
1480, FR: 3456, NL: 713, CH: 447. Source Political Action: An Eight Nation Study, 1973–1976,
distributed by GESIS www.gesis.org (ZA0765). For France: Enquête post-électorale française 1978,
CEVIPOF, distributed by the Centre de Données Socio-politiques, http://cdsp.sciences-po.fr
Names of classes: Small = small business owners, Lar/self = large employers and self-employed
professionals, Manag = managers, Tech = technical professionals, Socio = socio-cultural professionals,
Clerk = clerks, Prod = production workers, Serv = service workers
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axis.7 In all the countries examined with the exception of France, produc-
tion workers were the strongest supporters of social democracy/labour
and the difference vis-à-vis the average supporter reached around 15
percentage points. In absolute terms, social democratic parties received
between 60 and 70% of the working-class vote in Austria, Great Britain
and Germany and slightly under half the working-class vote in the Nether-
lands and Switzerland. In relative terms, production workers’ support for
social democratic parties exceeded average support by a factor of 1.28
in Austria, 1.32 in Great Britain, 1.36 in Germany, 1.30 in the Nether-
lands and 1.44 in Switzerland. The conclusion is the same if one uses
either absolute or relative support. Without any doubt, social democracy
received strong support from the working class in the 1970s.
Social democratic parties obtained weak scores among small busi-
ness owners, large employers and self-employed professionals. However,
they benefited from an intermediate level of support from various other
classes. Most distinctively, they were particularly successful among service
workers—a relatively small group at the time, as we will see later—
in several countries. They also enjoyed intermediate to above-average
support from clerks, socio-cultural professionals and in some countries
technical professionals and managers. This suggests that already in the
1970s social democracy could not be described as a purely working-class
movement.
The French Socialist Party had a different class profile in 1978. Its
penetration among production workers was much smaller (a ratio of
1.13). Moreover, production workers did not outdistance various other
groups of wage earners. The cross-class (or ‘interclassist’) character of
the French Socialist Party is often emphasised in the literature (e.g. Rey
2004; Lefebvre and Sawicki 2006). The main reason for this was the
presence of the Communist Party (see Michelat and Simon 2004; Mischi
2010; Moschonas 2002), which was the first party chosen by production
workers in France according to our results. On average, the Communist
Party received 21% of the vote but it gathered 36% of production workers’
votes (a ratio of 1.71). Together, the Socialist Party and the Communist
Party obtained 64% of production workers’ votes, a level no different from
elsewhere. The Communist Party also received intermediate support from
service workers, clerks and technical professionals (19–21%) but reached
lower levels among socio-cultural professionals (17%), managers (14%)
and especially small business owners and large employers/self-employed
professionals (7%). Even the Communist Party could not be described as a
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pure working-class party in the 1970s because it reached an intermediate
level of support from a mix of classes.
The analysis has so far been restricted to workers who participated
in the election. We must now analyse the basic question of the levels
of participation of the different social classes. It is striking to observe
from Table 3.1 that production worker participation did not differ very
much from the average level in several of the countries. This was espe-
cially the case in Austria and France. In Austria, for example, they were
almost as likely to turn out as large employers and self-employed profes-
sionals. There were more inequalities in other countries. In Great Britain
and the Netherlands, production workers were the group that participated
the least in elections, and they were the group that participated second-
least after service workers in Germany and Switzerland. By contrast, the
salaried middle classes and large employers generally displayed the highest
levels of participation.
The importance of production workers in the employment structure in
the 1970s made social democratic support logically composed of produc-
tion workers to a large extent. It is therefore necessary to observe, in
relative terms, the extent to which social democratic party electorates
were more working class than the total electorate. Again using the 8-
class schema, Table 3.2 presents the composition of social democratic
party electorates and for comparison purposes the composition of the
total electorates (including the people who did not vote).
Austria and Great Britain were the two countries where social democ-
racy obtained the highest shares of production workers’ votes (see
Figure 3.2) and production workers contributed the most to this party
Table 3.1 Participation by social class in the 1970s (in %)
Prod Serv Clerk Socio Tech Manag Lar/self Small Mean
AT 91 89 89 96 88 92 92 96 92
GB 68 80 74 76 87 73 72 81 73
DE 89 88 94 98 96 99 100 96 93
FR 93 92 93 92 90 95 100 95 94
NL 72 78 80 90 84 89 89 86 80
CH 51 38 59 67 65 75 74 54 57
Notes Number of cases: AT: 1256, GB: 992, DE: 1751, FR: 3809, NL: 921, CH: 920. See the
information under Fig. 3.2 for sources and names of classes
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Table 3.2 Composition of social democratic party electorates and total
electorates in the 1970s (in %)
Prod Serv Clerk Socio Tech Manag Lar/self Small
AT SPÖ 46 19 12 5 2 11 1 5
Total 35 14 13 5 2 11 1 19
GB Labour 49 18 16 7 2 5 1 3
Total 39 14 18 7 3 9 3 7
DE SPD 38 17 18 7 6 10 1 4
Total 30 15 19 7 5 12 1 11
FR PS 31 13 18 12 4 12 1 12
Total 27 13 16 11 4 11 2 18
NL PvdA 29 20 22 9 6 11 1 2
Total 25 19 21 11 4 9 2 8
CH SPS 36 9 19 9 9 11 2 5
Total 31 11 14 7 7 13 4 15
Notes See the information under Fig. 3.2 for sources, names of classes and numbers of cases (see also
Table 3.1). The total electorate includes non-voters and therefore refers to the population entitled
to vote
family’s electoral results. They represented almost one in two social demo-
cratic voters in these countries—this was also the case of the Communist
Party in France, with 47% of its votes coming from production workers.
They made up more than a third of the social democratic electorates in
Germany and Switzerland but less than a third in France and the Nether-
lands. Social democratic parties were clearly helped by the class structure
of the time but their supporters were, in relative terms, much more
working class than the total electorate, especially in Austria (ratio: 1.31),
Germany (ratio: 1.27) and Great Britain (ratio: 1.26). The contrast with
the mainstream right-wing parties is also instructive. Production workers
represented a non-negligible share of the centre-right parties’ electorates
but they never constituted more than approximately a quarter of them in
all the countries of our sample.
While the importance of production workers in the social democratic
electorate is evident, it does not go beyond the 50% threshold. Social
democratic/socialist/labour parties were therefore dependent on mobil-
ising allied classes to some extent, in particular lower white-collar workers.
This again suggests that social democratic parties were not pure working-
class parties in the 1970s. Service workers and clerks together represented
around a third of the social democratic electorate at the time—less than a
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third in Austria (27%) and Switzerland (28%) to be more precise. The
proportion even reached 42% in the Netherlands. The Dutch Labour
Party could clearly compensate for the relatively small size of production
workers in the Netherlands.
By contrast, the salaried middle classes represented less than a fifth
of the social democratic electorates in Austria and Great Britain (18 and
14% if one adds the shares of socio-cultural professionals, technical profes-
sionals and managers) and around a quarter in the other countries. The
proportion reached 29% in Switzerland and thus equalled the level of
lower white-collar workers. The proportion is also relatively high for the
cross-class French Socialist Party (28%). The stronger role of lower white-
collar workers relatively to that of the salaried middle classes is also a
product of the class structure. The salaried middle classes represented
small groups in the total electorate at the time.
The analyses focusing on the distinctiveness of the working class in
its vote and the contribution of the working class to social democra-
cy’s electoral score point to similar logics. This party family mobilised
production workers relatively strongly. However, no social democratic
party came close to the ideal type of pure working-class (or produc-
tion workers’) party. Service workers were often as distinctive in their
support for social democracy as production workers and contributed to
its electoral scores. One must therefore think of social democratic parties
in the 1970s as alliances between blue-collar workers and lower white-
collar workers, who together represented a significant share of the total
eligible electorate. It is therefore more appropriate to use the concept of
hybrid working-class parties. The observations made by Kirchheimer in
1966 that social democracy could successfully open to other segments of
the electorate seem to be correct. Social democracy strongly mobilised
production workers but at the same time managed to mobilise lower
white-collar workers.
However, the analysis has also demonstrated some considerable cross-
national variation. The British Labour Party and the Austrian Social
Democratic Party were the parties going the most in the direction
of pure working-class parties because they mobilised production work-
ers’ votes the most strongly. By contrast, the French Socialist Party
mobilised production workers and allied classes at similar levels and there-
fore had affinities with the cross-class type. The Dutch Labour Party
reached stronger mobilisation among lower non-manual workers than
among production workers. The Swiss Social Democratic Party mobilised
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production workers relatively well but at the same time already had a more
diverse profile than in other countries.
The finding that social democratic parties are not pure working-class
parties is not dramatically new. Indeed, it is in line with several studies that
have emphasised diversity in social democracy’s electoral support in the
decades following the war. For example, in her analysis of Eurobarometer
survey data, Best (2011) underlines the importance of the non-manual
population in social democratic vote shares in the mid-1970s. Moschonas
(2002: 50–51) characterises social democracy in the 1950s and 1960s as
an ‘enlarged coalition of the working class’. According to him, there was
a strong predominance of the working-class electorate in its social basis
but at the same time social democracy could benefit from some support
from the salaried middle classes. Bergounioux (1989) also insisted on the
early transformation of the class composition of social democratic parties
(before 1914) and their opening towards other groups of wage earners.
However, in the context of recent discussions about the transformations
of social democracy, it is essential to remember the hybrid character of
social democracy and to carefully consider the baseline, as we do in this
chapter.
Finally, one might also wonder whether the combination of produc-
tion workers’ support with that of other classes observed already signals
an important transformation in the class profile of social democracy. One
can read the results in two different directions: as representative of social
democracy’s original ambition to appeal to allied classes or as indicating a
transformation of social democracy in which there is a trade-off between
working-class and middle-class support (Przeworski and Sprague 1986).
It is not clear which direction is the more accurate. Nonetheless, it is inter-
esting to observe that the mobilisation of production workers remained
at a relatively high level in the 1970s—which is different from what we
will observe in the next chapter for the more recent period.
Dominance Over the Working-Class Vote
Logically, strong working-class mobilisation by social democracy also
prevents other parties from penetrating this segment of the electorate. I
now consider the competition that social democracy faces for its core elec-
torate. Three scenarios are possible. First, a social democratic party may
be the only party that captures most of the working-class vote and there
is no other serious competitor. Second, a social democratic party may
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compete with another party for the working-class vote. Third, there can
be open competition among several (or all) parties for the working-class
vote. Analogously to the typology developed by Oesch and Rennwald
(2018), the working class forms the party preserve of social democracy in
the first scenario. In the second case, the working class is the contested
stronghold of two parties, and in the third case, there is open competition
between parties. One can therefore analyse the type of competition by
considering the number of parties which receive above-average electoral
support from the working class.
Next to communist parties, Christian Democratic parties were poten-
tial competitors for the working-class vote in the 1970s. Their cross-class
appeal and support represent an important characteristic of this party
family (Duncan 2015; Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010; Knutsen 2006).
However, as we will see, in most cases, Christian Democratic parties
did not receive above-average support from production workers. Social
democracy therefore enjoyed a sort of monopoly over the representation
of production workers in most of the countries. Thus, production workers
constituted the party preserve of social democracy.
In Austria, a quarter of the production workers’ votes went to the
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), which obtained an average of 39% of
the vote share—the ratio is therefore 0.64. In Great Britain, the Conser-
vatives gathered 31% of production workers’ votes, against 46% of the
total electorate’s (a ratio of 0.67). In Germany, the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) enjoyed 35% of the production workers’ votes, compared
with an overall average of 43% (a ratio of 0.81). In Switzerland, the party
second-best supported by production workers was the Christian Demo-
cratic People’s Party (CVP) (18% of production workers’ votes against
20% overall, a ratio of 0.9), and the Radical Democratic Party (FDP) was
only the third party, with 13% of the workers’ votes (against 22% overall,
a ratio of 0.59). Around 20% of production workers’ votes went to other
smaller parties in the fragmented Swiss party system.
The cross-class character of Christian democracy was more visible
in Switzerland and Germany than in Austria. However, it was most
pronounced in the case of the Netherlands. The three confessional parties
merging in 1977 in the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) received
36% of production workers’ votes, against an average of 32% (a ratio of
1.12). This was the only case in our sample where two parties received
above-average electoral support from production workers. The People’s
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Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) received only 2.5% of produc-
tion workers’ votes but it gathered 14% of the votes on average (a ratio
of 0.18). Production workers were therefore the contested strongholds
of both social democracy and Christian democracy in this country. The
Netherlands therefore represented an exception to the monopoly of social
democracy.
Finally, the importance of competition with the Communist Party
in France has already been mentioned. It should be added that the
Gaullist and non-Gaullist centre-right parties both received around 14%
of production workers’ votes and each gathered an average of 20–21%
of the overall vote (a ratio of 0.67). Production workers were therefore
the contested strongholds for both social democracy and communism in
France.
Summing Up
The results presented in this chapter indicate that in the 1970s social
democracy relied on strong support from production workers, who gener-
ally had a relatively high level of participation in elections. However,
several elements indicate that social democracy also relied on the mobili-
sation of other allied classes. It reached a medium level of support among
various segments of wage earners and especially among service workers.
Lower non-manual classes also brought a non-negligible contribution to
the electoral results of social democratic parties. Social democracy in the
1970s therefore cannot be described as a pure working-class movement.
This party family came closer to the ideal type of hybrid working-class
party. However, there was also some considerable cross-national varia-
tion. Some social democratic parties were clearly less hybrid than others,
in particular when they faced no competition from Christian Democrats.
When social democracy faced significant competition from communists,
it also had a tendency to display affinities with the cross-class party type,
as in the case in France.
Notes
1. I leave aside here the question of the representation of interests and focus
purely on the sociology of the electorate.
2. Gingrich and Häusermann consider the combined support for social demo-
cratic, communist and green parties. However, they mention that their
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results are similar if they only focus on social democratic parties (see also
Häusermann 2018).
3. It should be added that their empirical analysis is based on data from the
Eurobarometer, where respondents’ occupations are classified according to
the blue-collar vs. white-collar distinction. Constrained by the data, the
authors group an important part of lower white-collar workers (skilled
service workers) with the middle class. This produces an over-large segment
of middle-class voters, or at least a larger segment than I use in this study.
4. The term ‘new class’ was originally used by American social scientists (e.g.
Gouldner 1979; see also Brint 1985) and conservative thinkers to grasp
the rise of liberalism and dissent among American professionals in the late
1960s.
5. In an analysis of Republican and Democrat voters, Axelrod (1972)
proposed that the contribution of a given group to a party’s score must
be seen as a combination of the loyalty of the group to the political party,
its turnout and its size (for recent applications, see Best 2011; Bürgisser
and Kurer 2019).
6. The detailed vote shares obtained by social democratic parties are available
in Appendix.
7. The average vote shares are derived from the survey. The data have not
been weighted to adjust for the official election results.
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CHAPTER 4
The Class Basis of Social Democracy
at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century
Abstract This chapter is dedicated to an empirical analysis of the class
basis of social democracy at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
The analyses presented rely on data from the European Social Survey
2010–2015. They show a strong tendency of social democratic parties
towards becoming cross-class parties, mobilising no specific social class in
particular. Despite the widespread assumption, only a minority of social
democratic parties have become new class parties strongly mobilising
specific segments of the salaried middle classes. The chapter also demon-
strates that the working-class vote has become much more fragmented.
In this group, social democracy now competes with radical left parties,
populist radical right parties and abstention.
Keywords Voting · Abstention · Social democracy · Radical left parties ·
Radical right parties · Middle classes
Small and Large Breaks with the Working Class
Political science research has pointed towards an increase in abstention
from voting in Western countries since the end of the 1980s (Blais 2007;
Wattenberg 2000). I therefore start by considering the extent to which
abstention has increased among working-class voters. This is a crucial first
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step before analysing their party choice and drawing conclusions on the
class profile of social democracy. When abstention is high, the decision
to support social democracy is made among a relatively smaller group of
citizens. The most important decision for an increasing share of workers
in this context simply becomes the choice between participating and not
participating.
The analyses presented in this chapter focus on the beginning of the
twenty-first century. They are based on data from the European Social
Survey (ESS), which offers detailed information about the respondents’
occupations. More precisely, the analyses focus on the first five years of
the 2010s decade for pragmatic reasons of data availability.1 For each
country, I first list all the elections that took place during this time period
(this means the 2012 French election, the 2013 Austrian and German
elections, the 2010 and 2012 Dutch elections, the 2011 and 2015 Swiss
elections and the 2010 and 2015 British elections) and then select the
ESS survey round closest to the election.2 Of course, the results are to
some extent influenced by the specificities of these particular elections
and the electoral performance of Social Democrats and their competi-
tors in these elections. However, apart from some specific features, all
these elections are representative of a new environment in which social
democracy faces new competitors in the party systems and copes with low
turnouts. In all these elections, social democracy displays a weak electoral
performance (see Appendix)—only the French Socialist Party managed to
secure a relatively good result in the 2012 election, before a strong elec-
toral defeat in 2017. The electoral decline of social democracy has been
particularly strong since 2008 (see Bremer and Rennwald 2019), accel-
erating a continual decline since electoral peaks in the 1960s and 1970s
(see Rennwald and Pontusson 2020).
Table 4.1 displays participation percentages in elections by social class
in the period between 2010 and 2015. The electoral participation of
workers does not go beyond 76%. This value—for Germany—is the
highest in our sample. In contrast, in three countries, the participation
of managers is higher than 90%. In four countries, this is also the case
for the category of large employers and the self-employed. In the 1970s,
the participation of workers reached more than 90% in two countries.
At that time, workers were almost as likely to participate in elections as
the average citizen in several countries. For example, in Austria, worker
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Table 4.1 Participation by social class in 2010–2015 (in %)
Prod Serv Clerk Socio Tech Manag Lar/self Small Mean
AT 72 67 77 87 87 91 91 88 78
GB 65 65 80 87 83 82 86 77 75
DE 76 74 85 89 88 93 92 85 84
FR 70 79 79 86 84 85 100 82 80
NL 74 76 82 91 88 92 97 85 84
CH 57 54 66 79 70 77 86 74 69
Notes Number of cases: AT: 1546, GB: 3960, DE: 2652, FR: 1695, NL: 3358, CH: 2305. Source:
European Social Survey (ESS), Norwegian Centre for Research Data, https://www.europeansocials
urvey.org. Different ESS rounds are selected for each country: rounds 5–6 (2010–2012) for the
Netherlands, round 6 (2012) for France, round 7 (2014) for Austria and Germany, rounds 6 (2012)
and 8 (2016) for Britain and Switzerland. The data are weighted by design weights
Names of classes: Prod = production workers, Serv = service workers, Clerk = clerks, Socio =
socio-cultural professionals, Tech = technical professionals, Manag = managers, Lar/self = large
employers and self-employed professionals, Small = small business owners
participation almost reached the average overall participation rate (a ratio
of 0.99).
In contrast, in the 2010s, the ratio of worker electoral participation to
the overall average in Austria was 0.92. Indeed, in all countries, this ratio
became smaller: from 0.92 to 0.86 in Great Britain, from 0.96 to 0.91 in
Germany, from 1 to 0.88 in France, from 0.90 to 0.88 in the Netherlands
and from 0.89 to 0.82 in Switzerland. In contrast, in many countries,
participation by the group of large employers and self-employed profes-
sionals increased relatively to the average: from 1 to 1.16 in Austria, from
0.98 to 1.14 in Great Britain, from 1.08 to 1.10 in Germany, from 1.07
to 1.25 in France and from 1.11 to 1.14 in the Netherlands. Inequalities
in participation therefore clearly increased over time3 and social demo-
cratic parties were less able to bring workers to the ballot box in the
2010s.
Therefore, workers participate in elections much less than in the past.
To what extent can social democratic political parties benefit from the
support of this smaller group of workers who effectively participate in
elections? Figure 4.1 presents the shares of votes obtained by social demo-
cratic parties from different social classes in 2010–2015, with parties’
average scores on the vertical axis.4 In the 2010s, production workers
were only the strongest supporters of social democracy/labour in Austria
and Great Britain. In absolute terms, social democratic parties received
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a) AT: 2013 (mean: 33%) b) GB: 2010/2015 (mean: 32.2%)
c) DE: 2013 (mean: 27.4%) d) FR: 2012 (mean: 37%)







































































































Fig. 4.1 Support for social democratic parties in 2010–2015 in six countries
by social class
Notes The election year is given in the headings. Number of cases: AT: 1023, GB: 2789, DE: 1997,
FR: 1205, NL: 2713, CH: 1434. See the information under Table 4.1 for sources and names of
classes
around 40% of production workers’ votes in Austria, Great Britain and
France, 30% in Germany and less than a quarter in the Netherlands and
Switzerland. Clearly, average support for social democracy/labour gener-
ally decreased since the 1970s, but even in relative terms production
worker support for social democracy was not greatly different to average
4 THE CLASS BASIS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY … 55
support. In relative terms, production worker support for social democ-
racy exceeded average support by a factor of 1.31 in Austria (against
1.28 in the 1970s), 1.20 in Great Britain (1.32), 1.13 in the Nether-
lands (1.30), 1.11 in Germany (1.36), 1.07 in France (1.13) and 1.05
in Switzerland (1.44). Relative support for social democracy therefore
shrank in all countries except Austria.5 Among those fewer workers who
took part in electoral contests, there was still an over-representation
of social democratic voting, albeit of much weaker intensity (see also
Knutsen 2006).
The same is also true for service workers—a category that displayed
a consistently high level of support for social democracy in the 1970s.
They too became less distinct supporters of social democracy over time.
Generally, differences across classes in their degree of sympathy for social
democracy were generally smaller in the 2010s than in the 1970s. The
case of small business owners illustrates this well. While this group
continued to remain the least likely to support social democracy, its
aversion to this party family reduced in almost all countries.6
Already in the 1970s, several classes displayed intermediate support
for social democracy. Clerks, socio-cultural professionals and technical
professionals continued to present intermediate to above-average support
for social democracy in the 2010s, with some variation across countries.
Managers, who were in some countries relatively strong opponents of
social democracy in the 1970s, displayed intermediate support for social
democracy in the 2010s. However, none of the classes presented particu-
larly strong above-average support for social democracy, at least in Austria,
Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands. When the distinctiveness
of service and production workers in their support for social democracy
weakened, no other class took a prominent role and served as the leading
social democrat supporters. Social democratic parties were therefore more
likely to have become cross-class parties with an intermediate level of
support among various classes, including among the former strongholds
of production and service workers.
France and Switzerland represent exceptions to this general pattern. In
these countries, a specific segment of the salaried middle classes displayed
a strong affinity with the socialist parties in the 2010s. In both coun-
tries, socio-cultural professionals were the strongest supporters of socialist
parties. The support from this class exceeded average support by a factor
of 1.53 in Switzerland and 1.48 in France. They clearly outdistanced
production workers, who displayed only average support for the French
56 L. RENNWALD
Socialist Party and the Swiss Social Democratic Party. In these two cases,
socialist/social democratic parties therefore came closer to being new class
parties.
In the recent period, production workers did not make a massive
contribution to social democracy’s electoral scores. As for the 1970s,
Table 4.2 indicates the class composition of the social democratic elec-
torate. It also reports the class composition of the total electorate, which
includes non-voters here. Not only was production workers’ support for
social democracy not very different to that of the average voter (see
above), but the importance of workers in the electorate also dramati-
cally reduced. If we only consider production workers, their contribution
to social democracy’s electoral results was therefore relatively limited. In
five of the six countries, production workers represented less than 20% of
the social democracy electorate. In relative terms too, social democratic
parties were no more working class than the total electorate. One must
not forget that the widespread abstention among workers—which is taken
into account in this analysis—contributed to depressing the working-class
character of social democracy. However, Austria represents an exception
to this pattern, with production workers still constituting a quarter of the
social democratic electorate.
Table 4.2 Composition of social democratic party electorates and total
electorates in 2010–2015 (in %)
Prod Serv Clerk Socio Tech Manag Lar/self Small
AT SPÖ 25 24 17 11 6 12 2 4
Total 22 23 15 11 7 11 2 10
GB Labour 15 26 11 14 6 16 3 9
Total 15 25 12 11 6 16 2 12
DE SPD 18 15 18 13 11 17 3 5
Total 18 15 15 14 9 16 4 10
FR PS 18 21 8 17 10 19 1 6
Total 19 22 10 11 10 17 1 10
NL PvdA 12 22 11 20 7 21 2 5
Total 12 20 12 16 5 21 3 11
CH SPS 12 10 8 26 14 18 4 9
Total 14 16 10 15 11 19 4 11
Notes See the information under Table 4.1 for sources, names of classes and numbers of cases (see
also Fig. 4.1). The total electorate includes non-voters and therefore refers to the population entitled
to vote
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If we consider service workers as part of the working class, the
working-class contribution to social democracy’s electoral score becomes
more important. Interestingly, it approximates to the scores found in
the 1970s for production workers. In the 2010s, production and service
workers represented almost half of the SPÖ electorate, around 40% of
the Labour and the Socialist Party electorates, a third of the PvdA and
the SPD electorates, but only a quarter of the SPS electorate in Switzer-
land. Hence, the definition of ‘working class’ is crucial in any evaluation
of the contemporary class character of social democracy. Incorporating
the new service proletariat into a broad ‘middle-class’ category would
clearly change the conclusions of such an exercise and tilt social demo-
cratic parties towards being middle class. However, it should again be
noticed that the importance of the enlarged working-class electorate to
social democracy is more the product of the class structure—production
and service workers together represent non-negligible segments of the
electorate—than the product of a strong over-representation of workers
among voters for this party family.
We noticed before the prominent level of support by socio-cultural
professionals in Switzerland and France. However, their contribution to
the electoral score of social democracy remained relatively modest, as
is shown in Table 4.2. They represented a quarter of the Swiss Social
Democratic Party’s electorate and a fifth of the French Socialist Party’s.
In relative terms, this is already a significant contribution since socio-
cultural professionals represented only 11% of the French electorate and
15% of the Swiss electorate. This segment of the new middle classes was
simply too small to have the same importance in the social democratic
electorate as production workers in the past: they never exceeded 16%
of the total electorate in all countries. While the analysis above of the
distinctiveness of classes pointed in the direction of new class parties in
France and Switzerland, this second indicator of class contribution puts
this conclusion into perspective.
In a few countries, managers made up a sizeable proportion of the
social democratic electorate in the 2010s (up to one in five social demo-
cratic voters). The reason is that in almost all the countries they repre-
sented an important group in the total electorate, even larger than the
group of socio-cultural professionals in most of the countries. However,
this class has no particular affinity with social democracy. Its sizeable
contribution to social democracy’s electoral score was therefore more a
product of the class structure. Hence, the social democratic electorate
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was to some extent a mirror of the composition of the total electorate.
This again suggests a proximity to a cross-class type.
The New Fragmentation
of the Working-Class Vote
Were there other parties which competed for the working-class vote? As
the previous chapter showed, in the 1970s production workers consti-
tuted the party preserve of social democracy in most countries. Hence,
social democracy enjoyed a sort of monopoly over the representation of
production workers. The dominance of the socialist/Labour Party was
only contested in France and the Netherlands, by the Communist Party
in France and by the Christian Democratic Party in the Netherlands. In
the 2010s, competition for the working-class vote was fiercer, since several
parties received above-average electoral support from production workers.
Table 4.3 lists the parties which were in competition with social democ-
racy for the working-class vote in the 2010s. It only includes parties
that received above-average support from production workers. The table
indicates the parties’ vote shares among production workers next to the


























Notes The table lists the parties which receive above-average
electoral support from production workers (after social democracy)
with indications of their vote share among production workers. The
parties’ average vote share is shown in parentheses, together with
the ratio of the two numbers. See the information under Table 4.1
for sources
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are generally under-represented in surveys, and the ESS is no exception
to this. Interestingly, only parties from the radical right and the radical
left7 enjoyed above-average electoral support from production workers,
after social democracy. This was never the case for mainstream right
parties or Green parties. In three of the countries (Austria, Great Britain
and Switzerland), social democratic parties were in competition with the
radical right. In the other three countries (Germany, France and the
Netherlands), social democratic parties competed with both the radical
right and the radical left. Therefore, in some instances, the working class
was the contested stronghold of social democracy and the radical right,
while in others there was open competition among three parties for the
working-class vote. Social democracy’s monopoly over the working-class
vote had therefore clearly ended.
Relative electoral support by production workers was generally more
pronounced in the case of radical right parties than in the case of radical
left parties. This means that production workers differed more from the
average voter in their support for radical right parties than in their support
for radical left parties. The ratios are particularly high for the National
Front (FN) in France and the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Nether-
lands. Production workers’ support for these parties was twice as strong
as that of the total electorate. In the elections analysed in this table, the
Alternative for Germany (AfD) was only at the beginning of its electoral
progression (it later gathered 12.6% of the votes in 2017). However, it
already received more than average support from production workers.
Of course, one should remember that, being large parties, mainstream
right parties often gather a sizeable share of production workers’ votes
in absolute terms. By extension, they are also in competition for the
working-class vote. This was especially the case in Germany, where in
this period the Conservatives (CDU) obtained 37% of production work-
ers’ votes, against an average of 38% from the overall electorate. The
results are less impressive in the other countries, but the British Conser-
vatives still received 28% of production workers’ votes (against 37% on
average) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) obtained 20% (against
27% on average). In the other cases, the share of production workers’
votes going to mainstream parties of the right was more limited (between
10 and 16%). However, in none of the countries studied did mainstream
right parties received above-average electoral support from production
workers, not even in the Netherlands, where the Christian Democrats
(CDA) competed most clearly for the working-class vote in the 1970s.
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As it became a smaller party, the CDA increased its ‘bourgeois’ char-
acter. By contrast, in Austria, Great Britain and Germany, production
workers became less reluctant to support the mainstream right in the
2010s compared to the 1970s. The most important change concerns the
CDU, whose level of support among production workers was almost as
strong as that among the entire electorate.8
The new working-class profile of radical right parties has attracted
much attention in recent years. Therefore, our results can now be comple-
mented by turning to the class composition of radical right parties. It is
not an entire surprise that workers make up a sizeable proportion of the
radical right electorate. If we again count production and service workers
together, they represented almost half (48%) of the PVV’s electorate in
the Netherlands (but only 34 and 37% of those of the Dutch Labour
Party and the Socialist Party, respectively), over half (57%) of the FN’s
electorate in France (but only 39% of the French Socialists’ and 38% of the
Front de Gauche’s) and much more than half (62%) of the Freedom Party
of Austria (FPÖ) (but only 49% of the Austrian Social Democrats’). The
share of the working class in the United Kingdom Independence Party
(UKIP) electorate was slightly lower (44% against 41% of the Labour
Party’s). This was also the case of AfD (42% against 33% of the German
Social Democrats’ and 30% of Die Linke’s). The Swiss People’s Party’s
(SVP) share (33% against 22% for the Swiss Social Democrats) was clearly
smaller in Switzerland, where farmers and small business owners—the
traditional constituency of the former agrarian party—still constitute an
important electoral base (e.g. Rennwald 2014).
Undeniably, at the aggregate level, social democracy and radical right
parties share commonalities in the class profile of their supporters.
However, recognising this does not mean that there were direct trans-
fers of votes between the radical right and social democracy. Studies
show that the numbers of direct transfers were relatively limited. In an
article analysing the electoral decline of social democracy, Rennwald and
Pontusson (2020) show that only 8% of former social democratic party
voters switched to the radical right in the next election in the period
2001–2015 in sixteen industrialised countries. The most common option
was to choose mainstream parties of the right (45%), followed by the
radical left (16%), abstention (16%) and the Greens (15%). In a detailed
study of voter transitions in the British context, Evans and Mellon (2016)
find that in 2015 UKIP primarily mobilised 2010 Conservative voters,
obtaining its strongest result in all general elections with 12.6% of the
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vote. However, these same conservative voters were former non-voters or
2005 Labour voters. In a time of high electoral volatility, indirect tran-
sitions from social democracy to the radical right, transitioning via the
centre-right or abstention, are well plausible.
Interestingly, many studies suggest that social democratic parties and
radical right parties recruit from different social milieus. Radical right
parties draw strong support from non-unionised voters, while social
democracy still performs better among unionised voters (Mosimann
et al. 2019). Workers who vote for social democracy do so based on
economic considerations, while those supporting radical right parties do
so for cultural reasons (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013; Oesch and Rennwald
2018). Instead of emphasising (indirect) transitions from social democ-
racy to the radical right, one can therefore adopt a different focus and
emphasise the existence of different working-class milieus (see also Vester
2001). From this perspective, social democracy fails to mobilise a more
‘leftist’ and ‘conscious’ working-class milieu (which prefers abstention
or radical left parties), while radical right parties succeed in mobilising
a non-organised and more ‘rightist’ working-class milieu. This analysis
challenges a widespread perception of the presence of a common pool of
supporters who switch from the left to the radical right.
Finally, it should also be emphasised that changes in workers’ voting
patterns are slow in coming and take place over several elections (e.g.
Rennwald and Evans 2014). The workers who nowadays vote for the
radical right are simply not the same persons as those who voted for
parties of the left a few decades ago. Therefore, generational replacement
may be another and complementary way to interpret the new competition
from the radical right (Gougou and Mayer 2013; Gougou 2012).
It is not possible to give a definitive response about transitions of the
working-class vote at the individual level in the framework of this book.
However, we can deliver a precise account of the fragmentation of the
working-class vote at the aggregate level. In order to get a global view of
workers’ votes today, it is possible to combine information on absten-
tion and party choice.9 Fig. 4.2 presents the complete set of options
available, first for production workers only and second for the average
citizen (indicated as ‘total’ in the figure). The information about party
choice is restricted to the largest parties competing in the given country.
These parties are classified in the usual European party families, while
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Fig. 4.2 Choices of abstention and voting for major parties (in %) among
production workers and average citizens, 2010–2015
Notes Number of cases: AT: 1360, GB: 3769, DE: 2426, FR: 1555, NL: 3251, CH: 2153. See the
information under Table 4.1 for sources
Party classifications: Social Democrats: SPD [DE], PvdA [NL], PS [FR], SPÖ [AT], Labour [UK],
SP [CH]; Greens: Greens [DE, AT, CH], GreenLeft [NL], EELV [FR]; Radical left: Linke [DE],
SP [NL], Left Front [FR]; Conservative/Christian Democrats: CDU/CSU [DE], CDA [NL], UMP
[FR], ÖVP [AT], Conservatives [UK], CVP [CH]; Liberals: FDP [DE], VVD + D66 [NL], MoDem
[FR], NEOS [AT], Liberal Democrats [UK], FDP [CH]; Radical right: AfD [DE], PVV [NL], FN
[FR], FPÖ [AT], UKIP [UK], SVP [CH]
for populist radical right parties are smaller than their actual proportion
according to official election results.
Figure 4.2 reminds us of the importance of not voting among the
options available to production workers. While we analysed not voting
separately at the beginning of this chapter, this direct comparison shows
the scope of workers not voting very well. Abstention went from a quarter
of production workers (in Germany) to a small half (in Switzerland). With
the exception of Germany, it was production workers’ first choice. Among
the options available to those who effectively voted, social democracy
was still the most common one in many countries—although it never
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exceeded a third of all options. It should be noticed that among those
who effectively went to the ballot box in Germany the first option for
production workers was a conservative vote (even before abstention),
while in Switzerland it was a vote for the Swiss People’s Party. These
results suggest that in all the countries, social democracy competed for
the workers’ vote on many fronts. Choosing to vote for social democ-
racy therefore represented just one possible option among many. Social
democracy’s monopoly over production workers’ votes is definitely a story
of the past.
Mobilising the Working Class and Allied Classes
Let us finally make a systematic comparison of the mobilisation of produc-
tion workers and allied classes at the two time points that we have analysed
in this and previous chapters. For this purpose, we can use the indicators
of distinctiveness (whether workers voted more than the average for social
democracy) and the absolute contribution (the proportion of workers in
the social democratic electorate). It is possible to group the values of these
indicators by distinguishing between strong, medium and weak mobilisa-
tions (for more details, see the note below Table 4.4). Of course, the
thresholds are always somewhat arbitrary but they allow a synthetic view
of changes over time.
Table 4.4 Mobilisation of production workers
1970s 2010s
Distinct. Contribution N. compet. Distinct. Contribution N. compet.
AT Medium (1.28) Strong (46%) 0 Strong (1.31) Medium (25%) 1
GB Strong (1.32) Strong (49%) 0 Medium (1.20) Weak (15%) 1
DE Strong (1.36) Medium (38%) 0 Weak (1.11) Weak (18%) 2
FR Weak (1.13) Medium (31%) 1 Weak (1.07) Weak (18%) 2
NL Strong (1.30) Medium (29%) 1 Weak (1.13) Weak (12%) 2
CH Strong (1.44) Medium (36%) 0 Weak (1.05) Weak (12%) 1
Notes The first column indicates the distinctiveness of support by production workers, the second
column shows the contribution of production workers to the party’s electoral score and the third
provides the number of parties with whom social democracy competes for the production workers’
vote. For distinctiveness, the values are grouped in four categories: > 1.30 = strong, 1.15–1.29
= medium, 1–1.14 = weak, < 0.99 = absent. For the contribution, > 45% = strong, 25–44% =
medium, 0–24% = weak. The ‘strong’ category is highlighted in bold
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As Table 4.4 shows, the distinctiveness and contribution indica-
tors show a relatively large mobilisation of production workers in the
1970s. This helped social democracy to beat the competition from other
parties—the third column indicates an absence of competition in many
countries. Social democracy could therefore enjoy a kind of monopoly
over the working-class vote. Due to the importance of the size of the
working class among the population eligible to vote, achieving some
degree of mobilisation among production workers was the key to relative
success for social democracy at this time.
In the more recent period, social democracy was less able to mobilise
production workers’ votes, as is indicated by the distinctiveness and
contribution indicators. It therefore faced greater competition for work-
ers’ votes. With the exceptions of Austria and Great Britain, there
were simultaneously weak distinctiveness and a weak contribution of
production workers.
Allied classes are also important for social democracy. In the 1970s,
mobilisation among the lower white-collar classes contributed strongly to
social democracy’s electoral results. In the 2010s, socio-cultural profes-
sionals had a significant new role for social democracy in some countries.
It is therefore interesting to understand the relationship of social democ-
racy to allied classes by comparing the mobilisation of these two classes.
Table 4.5 shows the mobilisation of service workers in the 1970s and that
of socio-cultural professionals in the 2010s.
In terms of contribution, the positions of service workers in the 1970s
and socio-cultural professionals in the 2010s are relatively similar. Their
contribution was weak in most cases—it did not go beyond a 20%
threshold. The only exception is Switzerland in the 2010s, where the
contribution of socio-cultural professionals reached a medium level. For
Table 4.5 Mobilisation of allied classes
Service workers (1970s) Socio-cultural professionals (2010s)
Distinctiveness Contribution Distinctiveness Contribution
AT Strong (1.33) Weak (19%) Absent (0.85) Weak (11%)
GB Medium (1.20) Weak (18%) Weak (1.06) Weak (14%)
DE Weak (1.14) Weak (17%) Absent (0.87) Weak (13%)
FR Weak (1.01) Weak (13%) Strong (1.48) Weak (17%)
NL Weak (1.13) Weak (20%) Medium (1.18) Weak (20%)
CH Medium (1.24) Weak (9%) Strong (1.53) Medium (26%)
Notes For explanations and legends, see Table 4.4
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the indicator of distinctiveness, there was greater divergence across coun-
tries in the 2010s than in the 1970s. The mobilisation of service workers
was weak to medium in most of the countries in the 1970s. In the 2010s,
the mobilisation of socio-cultural professionals was either absent or weak
in three countries and strong in two other countries.
Overall, in the 2010s, some social democratic parties combined a
weak mobilisation of production workers with a strong mobilisation of
socio-cultural professionals. This was the case of the Swiss Social Demo-
cratic Party and the French Socialist Party. In these cases, the direction
of modernisation adopted by these parties was towards being new class
parties. To some extent, this was also the road of the Dutch Labour Party,
which showed a medium mobilisation of socio-cultural professionals. In
the other cases, there was a combination of weak to medium mobilisation
of production workers and no mobilisation of socio-cultural professionals.
This suggests that social democracy took the direction of becoming a
cross-class party. Perhaps one should add an unsuccessful cross-class party.
The original intuition of enlarging its support to various classes included
the idea that this would be a new ‘winning formula’ for social democracy.
Summing Up
This chapter has shown a growing distance between production workers
and social democratic parties in the recent period. Not only were produc-
tion and service workers less likely to participate in elections in the 2010s
but when they did they were also less likely to support social democ-
racy than in the past. It is striking to observe a rapprochement between
production workers and other classes in their levels of support for social
democracy.
In the 2010s, social democratic parties more strictly represented the
class composition of the population eligible to vote than in the past.
Certainly, given the importance of the (new) middle classes in social
structures, it is logical for social democratic parties to also become more
middle class. However, there is not a particular affinity, as expressed by
the indicator of distinctiveness, between the new middle classes and social
democracy, although Switzerland and France are exceptions. It is there-
fore more accurate to think of social democratic parties as evolving in the
direction of cross-class parties than as simply middle-class parties.
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In the 2010s, social democracy was in competition with many parties
for the working-class vote. While the focus is often on the radical right
in the public discourse, the new voting choices of the working class are
much more complicated. Not only radical right parties but also radical
left parties received above-average support from the working class, while
abstention was also a very prominent choice among workers. Last but not
least, parties from the mainstream right also captured a non-negligible
share of the working-class vote, even if it was below average. All obser-
vations point in the same direction: the dominance of social democracy
over the working-class vote is definitively over.
Notes
1. The most recent period for which data from the European Social Survey
were available at the time of writing.
2. The selection of survey rounds is the following: round 7 for Austria and
Germany, round 6 for France, rounds 5 and 6 for the Netherlands, rounds
6 and 8 for Switzerland and Britain. When there are two rounds, pooled
results are presented.
3. Our results are in line with several recent studies that have examined class
(or income) differences in electoral participation (e.g. Evans and Tilley
2017; Goldberg 2019; Heath 2016; Schäfer 2015).
4. The average vote share is derived from the survey. The data are not
weighted to adjust for the official election results.
5. Examining the political alignments of unskilled workers in six democracies,
Brooks et al. (2006) also observed a relative stability in their support for
left parties in Austria from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. In contrast,
the authors noted declining attachments to left parties in Great Britain,
Germany and the Netherlands.
6. Studies examining the general association between social class and vote
also demonstrated a decline in class-based voting behaviour in numerous
countries (for recent comparative studies, see Jansen et al. 2013; Goldberg
2019).
7. One must notice here that the table does not include the small radical left
parties that can be found in Austria and Switzerland.
8. Elff and Roßteutscher (2017) also reported that the support for the CDU
at the 2013 German elections was stronger than the one for the SPD
among some groups of workers, this especially in East Germany.
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9. The number of cases in each country is slightly smaller than in Table 4.1.
Some individuals declare they participated in the election (in the informa-
tion presented in Table 4.1) but then do not give any information on the
party they chose (refusing to answer or responding ‘don’t know’).
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CHAPTER 5
Parties’ Changing Political Projects
andWorkers’ Political Attitudes
Abstract This chapter reviews possible explanations of workers’ new
voting patterns. It focuses on the contrast between changes in the way
parties mobilise (or do not mobilise) workers’ social class and changes in
workers’ political attitudes. In a first step, it discusses significant trans-
formations in social democracy’s political project and attempts by new
political parties to mobilise the votes of workers. In a second step, it
examines the political attitudes of workers on issues of redistribution and
immigration. Workers display a particular combination of political atti-
tudes: they support redistribution and at the same time they are opposed
to immigration. Importantly, the chapter shows a strong continuity over
time of this particular combination of attitudes. This suggests, therefore,
that a transformation in the political supply of parties is more decisive to
understand new voting patterns than changes in workers’ demands.
Keywords Social democracy · Third way · Attitudes · Immigration ·
Redistribution · Radical right
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Bringing Parties Back In
The extent to which people vote on the basis of their social class (and
hence the extent to which workers support parties of the left) depends on
mobilisation by political parties themselves, as was outlined in Chapter 2.
In this chapter, I will in a first step review major trends in parties’ polit-
ical projects and their attempts to mobilise workers. In a second step, I
will turn to an examination of worker’s political attitudes. The logic of
the chapter is to contrast changes in the way parties mobilise (or do not
mobilise) the social class of workers with changes in workers’ political
attitudes. I use a two-dimensional conceptualisation of the political space
(e.g. Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008), in which a socio-economic
dimension (relating to state intervention in the economy and the distribu-
tion of resources) is complemented by a socio-cultural dimension (relating
to the definition of the community and moral issues).
In the decades following the Second World War, the ambition to
reduce the disadvantaged position of workers stood at the core of the
political project of social democratic parties. Of course, social demo-
cratic parties were active in different political and institutional contexts
that shaped their policy positions and strategic decisions. However, it is
possible to identify the contours of a relatively coherent political project
across European countries, the concrete translation of which into policies
could vary from one context to another. One central pillar consisted in
developing a universal welfare state—best achieved in Scandinavian coun-
tries—that would reduce the dependence of workers on market forces or,
put differently, reduce the commodification of workers (Esping-Andersen
1990). Another central pillar concerned the development of collective
bargaining, which would allow the (wage) bargaining position of workers
relative to that of employers in the corporate arena to be enhanced. Trade
unions were the decisive actors in this arena, not parties, but close ties
between unions and social democratic parties (Ebbinghaus 1995; Allern
and Bale 2017) ensured the coherence of this political project.
Since the 1980s and 1990s, the development of ‘third way’ ideas and
policies marked a crucial change in this political project. Instead of seeking
a reformist way to enhance the power of labour relative to the power of
capital, third-way social democracy was more accommodative of global
market forces. It believed that ‘old-style social democracy’ could not face
various challenges such as those of globalisation and the influence of free
market ideas (Giddens 1998). Hence, the social democratic ambition no
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longer consisted in developing counter-forces to the power of capital. The
ambition was instead to find a new path between social democracy and
neoliberalism, thus definitively abandoning the long-term goal of a tran-
sition to socialism—Giddens evokes the ‘death of socialism’ (1998: 3).
The ‘social investment state’ was at the core of this new programme.
Priority was given to investment in human capital and less to the compen-
sation of income loss, thus implying a shift from redistribution to the
‘redistribution of possibilities’ (Giddens 1998: 99–100).
The turn towards third-way social democracy was personified the
most by the figures of Tony Blair in Great Britain (‘New Labour’) and
Gerhard Schröder in Germany (‘Neue Mitte’). As prime ministers of their
respective countries at the turn of the 2000s, they implemented policies
that matched this new ideational framework (e.g. Arndt 2013; Merkel
et al. 2008; Nachtwey 2009). They also attempted to theorise their new
approach in a document (see Blair and Schröder 1999) that, next to
Giddens’ book, is considered a major text of the third way (Nachtwey
2009: 10). However, transformations in the core ideas of social democ-
racy largely touched the social democratic party family over the entire
continent (e.g. Escalona 2018; Green-Pedersen et al. 2001; Huo 2009;
Keman 2011). It came as no surprise that many social democratic parties
endorsed and implemented austerity in the context of the 2008 economic
crisis (Bremer 2018; Bremer and McDaniel 2019; Escalona and Viera
2014).
It would be wrong to understand social democracy’s political project
as a purely socio-economic project. Socialist ideas have also involved an
important component of cultural emancipation, where freedom consti-
tutes a key value. The struggle for full democratisation of political life was
at the core of the agenda of socialist parties when they were created at the
end of the nineteenth century. They were also the first parties to work
for women’s voting rights. In countries with a significant church-state
cleavage, they generally adopted a clear secular position on issues relating
to the role of the church in society. There is no doubt that social democ-
racy has always adopted a clearer position in favour of cultural liberalism
as compared to Conservatives, Christian Democrats or even mainstream
liberal parties. However, these issues played a somewhat secondary role in
the social democratic political project, since the ambition was first of all
to reduce socio-economic inequalities.
The transformation of social democracy’s project towards more accom-
modation to market forces gave a new importance to ‘cultural’ issues. If
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social democracy was less willing or able to deliver results on the socio-
economic dimension, it became increasingly critical to achieve results on
the socio-cultural dimension—a dimension that is generally of increasing
salience in political competition (Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008).
On the basis of detailed case studies on four West European countries
(Germany, Great Britain, France and Sweden), Escalona (2018: 409)
demonstrates that new cultural issues (such as the promotion of women’s
rights and the elimination of discrimination against minorities) have
played a crucial role in the transformation of social democracy’s political
project since the mid-1970s. He observes a common trend towards an
increasing salience of these issues in the manifestos and policies of social
democratic parties in the post-1968 context—and not so much a change
in their positions. If one follows Escalona’s analysis, one cannot really
capture social democracy’s transformation by focusing solely on the third-
way turn. With the same logic, Rennwald and Evans (2014) underline
the importance of new cultural issues in the transformation of the polit-
ical offer of some social democratic parties. Martin (2018: 169) suggests
even taking a step further in the relation between the socio-economic and
socio-cultural components of social democracy’s new project. He argues
that the promotion of cultural liberalism had the function of ‘compensat-
ing’ for a lack of social democratic achievements while at the same time
allowing social democracy to respond to the aspirations of the new middle
classes.
Overall, the third-way turn of social democracy and the rise of new
issues on its political agenda weakened the possibility of a class-based
mobilisation of workers. One must not forget that social class is only one
possible source of identity, alongside gender, religion and ethnicity (see
Heerma van Voss and van der Linden 2002). Class was always in compe-
tition with other cleavages for votes (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). A worker
was therefore particularly likely to be mobilised on the basis of ‘cultural’
identities if he/she was not mobilised on the basis of social class. This
was the argument developed by Przeworski and Sprague (1986), who
emphasised the importance of the mobilisation of class relative to other
identities. In their view, the weakening of a class-based appeal would leave
room open for competing appeals based on religious, ethnic or regional
identity (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 45–46). As a result, workers may
not cast a class-based vote (and support social democratic parties) but
instead a vote based on religious or ethnic loyalties.
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During the post-war decades in Europe, religion was in strong compe-
tition with social class for votes (Knutsen 2004; Rose and Urwin 1969).
Christian Democratic trade unions and parties aimed to mobilise workers
on the basis of religious loyalty (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010). In
contrast, no major party explicitly mobilised workers on an ethnic or
nationalist basis in this period. Extreme right-wing parties, which were
often the direct heirs of the fascist regimes, remained at the margins of
politics for a long period after the Second World War. No party really
dared to exploit anti-migrant resentment. It is as if there was an agree-
ment among the political elite. This changed in the 1970s and 1980s,
when extreme right-wing parties turned to an anti-immigration strategy
and tried to demonstrate a clear distance from the fascist legacy (Carter
2005; Ignazi 1992; Mudde 2007).
One can therefore conceptualise today’s competition for the workers’
vote in the following way. Workers can be mobilised on the basis of their
social class by left-wing parties to improve redistribution (on this issue
social democratic parties are in competition with radical left parties) or
they can be mobilised by far right parties on the basis of their nationality
to restrict immigration. Clearly, parties’ political projects have changed
in recent decades and this has massively affected the political choices
available to workers (see Evans and De Graaf 2013). However, on the
‘demand-side’ it is not clear whether the political attitudes of workers
have also undergone important changes. In the next sections, I therefore
analyse the distribution of preferences by social class.
Between Pro-redistributive and Anti-immigration
Worker Preferences in the 1970s
One can expect that social classes diverge on the extent to which they
prefer redistribution and state intervention in the economy. Workers are
more in favour of redistribution, because this is a way of reducing their
more disadvantaged position in the labour market (see Evans and De
Graaf 2013). There is also a clear connexion between social class and
attitudes towards immigration. Workers, and particularly lower-skilled
workers, are likely to be the most affected by an increase in labour
supply. Hence, they should be more likely to be in favour of restricting
an increase in the supply of labour. Workers are therefore expected to
combine pro-redistributive preferences with anti-immigration preferences.
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In order to analyse the preferences of workers and social classes, I select
one question on redistribution and one question on immigration. I first
present findings for the mid-1970s1 and then for the early 2010s. I assess
whether the configuration of attitudes by social class is relatively stable
over time. In the Political Action Survey conducted in the mid-1970s,
respondents were asked how much responsibility the government has to
reduce wealth differences between people.2 They had to choose an answer
on a four-point Likert scale ranging from ‘an essential responsibility’ to
‘no responsibility at all’. I standardise the answers to the range from 0
to 1, where 1 means the strongest government responsibility. Figure 5.1
shows the preferences of workers relative to a few other classes on what I
name the ‘pro-redistribution scale’. I select production workers, service
workers, socio-cultural professionals and managers. I also present the
overall score for the total electorate (including non-voters). The choice of
these groups—with diverse segments of the working and (salaried) middle
classes—makes it possible to put the preferences of production workers
into perspective and to get an overall view of class configurations.
Overall, the respondents were in favour of redistribution. As expected,
production workers were always (slightly) more in favour of redistribu-


























































Fig. 5.1 Average position of selected classes on the pro-redistribution scale—
1970s
Notes Number of cases: AT: 1248, GB: 968, DE: 1746, NL: 896, CH: 920. Source Political Action:
An Eight Nation Study, 1973–1976, distributed by GESIS www.gesis.org [ZA0765].
Names of classes: Prod = production workers, Serv = service workers, Socio = socio-cultural
professionals, Manag = managers
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voting in the 1970s, service workers were relatively close to the position
of production workers. Managers were the least in favour of redistribu-
tion in comparison with the other classes. Interestingly, socio-cultural
professionals were in all the countries located closer to the position of
production workers than to that of managers, with the exception of
Austria. However, one should notice that class differences are relatively
small. The largest class differences can be found between managers and
production workers in Great Britain and Switzerland: differences of 0.14
points and 0.15 points respectively on the pro-redistribution scale.
Turning now to immigration, I start with a cross-national analysis
and then limit the analysis to Switzerland, where the issue of migration
came onto the political agenda very early. Starting with the cross-national
perspective, in the Political Action Survey, respondents were asked their
position on the provision of equal rights for guest workers (Gastar-
beiter)3—the question referred to coloured immigrants in Great Britain.
One should notice that the question does not tackle attitudes towards
immigration per se (towards the admission of immigrants or the benefits
of immigration, for example) but instead captures attitudes towards the
integration of immigrants. These are indeed two different dimensions of
migration preferences (Afonso 2013; Tichenor 2002). It is well possible
to combine a restrictive attitude towards the admission of migrants with
an allocation of equal rights to migrants (in terms of access to the labour
market, to the welfare state, to citizenship, etc.), while the contrary is also
possible. However, in the absence of any other question, I consider this a
viable proxy.
Figure 5.2 indicates that the respondents were on average relatively
open to immigration (with the exception of Austria). In most of the coun-
tries, production workers were slightly more restrictive towards migration
(or slightly more against the idea of according equal rights to immigrants)
than the average respondent. However, the differences are not always
significant. As for redistribution, service workers were located close to
production workers. Managers were also located close to the position of
production workers and to that of the average respondent. The largest
difference between production workers and managers was 0.08 points
in Germany. Socio-cultural professionals were clearly different to all the




























































Fig. 5.2 Average position of selected classes on the anti-immigration scale—
1970s
Notes Number of cases: AT: 1252, GB: 971, DE: 1752, NL: 890, CH: 923. Source and names of
classes: see the information under Fig. 5.1
Switzerland offers a unique opportunity to further study attitudes
towards immigration in the 1970s. The movement against ‘over-
foreignization’ (Überfremdung) that emerged in this country in the
1960s can be considered a forerunner of anti-migrant movements in
Europe (Skenderovic 2009). Since the 1960s, newly formed radical right
parties mobilised on the issue of immigration, playing on resentment
against guest workers, who had been massively recruited in the Swiss
economy in the post-war years. These parties launched several popular
initiatives against ‘over-foreignization’ demanding a drastic change in
immigration policy and several initiatives on foreign policy (Skenderovic
2009: 68). Between 1970 and 1977, no less than four anti-immigrant
initiatives were submitted to the vote and provoked heated public debates.
The first one launched the most intensive discussions in the public sphere.
It was entitled ‘Initiative against “over-foreignization”’ (gegen ‘Überfrem-
dung’ ), but it is sometimes known as the Schwarzenbach initiative after
the name of the leader of the National Action Party, James Schwarzen-
bach. It demanded restriction of the number of foreign residents to 10%
of the population in each canton. It was rejected in 1970 with a small
majority of the votes (54%), while the later initiatives were more firmly
rejected—support did not exceed 35% (Skenderovic 2009: 65–68).
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The Swiss component of the Political Action Study included some
specific questions, among them was one on the vote choice on the second
anti-immigrant initiative in 1974 (which was accepted by only 34.2% of
the electorate). A post-electoral survey related to the Swiss national elec-
tion of 1971 also included the vote choice on the 1970 Schwarzenbach
initiative. Only men were allowed to vote at the federal level until 1971
in Switzerland. Figure 5.3 presents the preferences of classes in these two
popular votes. Higher values indicate stronger support for the initiatives.
Preferences on immigration measured using support for these popular
initiatives indicate a stronger polarisation of classes than preferences on
immigration measured using answers on the provision of equal rights
to migrants. Production workers were now much more in favour of
restrictive migration policies. In contrast, socio-cultural professionals and
managers were more opposed to restrictive immigration policies (they
were twice or more than twice as opposed to restrictive migration poli-
cies as production workers were). Practically, this meant that on average
production workers supported the popular initiatives, while the salaried
middle classes voted against the initiative on average. In 1974, the level
of support for the initiative dropped, but the relative support of produc-
tion workers remained relatively similar (a ratio of 1.36 in 1970 and of
1.38 in 1974).
If one isolates the social democratic electorate, it can be observed that,
on average, social democratic voters gave the initiative in 1970 slightly
stronger support (0.45) than the total electorate (0.41) but still rejected























Fig. 5.3 Support for anti-immigration initiatives in Switzerland—1970s
Notes Number of cases: 1970: 652, 1974: 572. Sources Attitudes et comportements politiques en
Suisse—1972, Henry Kerr et al., Université de Genève/Universität Zürich; Attitudes politiques 1975
(Political Action: An Eight Nation Study, 1973–1976), Université de Genève. Datasets distributed
by FORS, https://forscenter.ch/
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it. This was in line with the party’s recommendation to reject the initia-
tive. It is possible to further differentiate within the social democratic
electorate by social class. However, the number of cases becomes rela-
tively small and one should remain cautious about the results. Among
the social democratic electorate, production workers accepted the initia-
tive (0.53), although the degree of support was smaller than among all
workers irrespective of their party choice (0.56). In 1974, support for the
anti-immigration initiative was this time slightly lower among the social
democratic electorate (0.31). However, support for the initiative was still
relatively strong among social democratic production workers (0.52).
Working-class support for the initiatives was in line with analyses based
on aggregate results that showed that support was strong in working-
class neighbourhoods (Gilg 1972). Moreover, the initiatives provoked
heated debates in the ranks of Swiss trade unions (Steinauer and von
Allmen 2000). Trade unions fought against the initiative submitted to
the popular vote in 1970 (and all other anti-immigrant initiatives) but
large segments of the rank and file disagreed with this position. This indi-
cates that the anti-immigration initiatives aroused sympathy, or at least
contributed to spreading confusion among organised workers. However,
it is interesting to note that at this time an important share of production
workers voted for the Swiss Social Democratic Party. There was there-
fore a unique combination of anti-immigration attitudes (and support for
anti-migration initiatives) and social democratic voting in national elec-
tions. In the arena of direct democracy, the small radical right parties that
launched the anti-migrant initiatives were major players at the time but
they remained fringe forces in the electoral arena (Skenderovic 2009).
They reached an electoral peak in the 1971 national election (7.5%) but
then experienced losses in later elections (Skenderovic 2009: 60). It was
only from the 1990s onwards that the Swiss People’s Party managed
to obtain strong electoral successes in national elections and definitively
transformed the Swiss party system.
Continuity in Class Preferences in the 2010s
Reproducing the same exercise for the first half of the 2010s leads to
similar conclusions about combinations of preferences by social class.
Workers combined a pro-redistributive position with an anti-immigration
position. For redistribution, I use a similar question on the role of the
government in income inequality. In the ESS, respondents were asked if
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they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: ‘the government
should reduce differences in income levels’ on a five-point Likert scale
(from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’). I standardise the answers to
the range from 0 to 1. On immigration, respondents were asked to take
a position on various dimensions of immigration. I use three questions
where respondents were asked to take a position on an eleven-point scale:
‘the country’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by immi-
grants’, ‘it is bad or good for the country’s economy that people come
to live here from other countries’, and ‘the country is made a worse or
better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries’.
I standardise the responses between 0 and 1 and calculate the average
value for these three items. I recode both items so that 1 means a pro-
redistributive position on redistribution and an anti-immigration position
on immigration. I use the same selection of elections and survey rounds
as in the previous chapter.
Figure 5.4 presents the position on redistribution for the first half of
the 2010s. Overall, there was high support for redistribution in all coun-
tries—a result that very often appears in contemporary work on redis-





































































Fig. 5.4 Average position of selected classes on the pro-redistribution scale—
2010–2015
Notes Number of cases: AT: 1524, GB: 3894, DE: 2646, FR: 1694, NL: 3348, CH: 2317. Source
European Social Survey [ESS], Norwegian Centre for Research Data, https://www.europeansocials
urvey.org. Rounds 5–8 [see Chapter 4 for the selection of rounds for each country]. The data are
weighted by design weights
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was not strong polarisation among social classes, production workers and
service workers were systematically more in favour of redistribution than
the average respondent. Managers were consistently less in favour of redis-
tribution than the average respondent and socio-cultural professionals
were located between. Their position was generally close to that of the
average respondent. In Germany and Switzerland, they even displayed a
more pro-redistributive attitude than the average respondent and came
close to the position of production and service workers.
Hence, the same structuration of classes on redistribution attitudes as
in the 1970s can be observed. On average, respondents wanted more
redistribution in the 2010s than in the 1970s, but the class differences
remained relatively stable. The case of Switzerland provides an inter-
esting comparison with the 1970s. Support for redistribution among the
total electorate reached exactly the same level. Support among workers
and socio-cultural professionals was almost identical. This is not the case
in all the countries. In Austria, production workers had become less
distinct from the average citizen in their redistribution attitudes over time.
In contrast, in the Netherlands, production workers had become more
distinct from the average citizen.
On immigration, production and service workers were systematically





































































Fig. 5.5 Average position of selected classes on the anti-immigration scale—
2010–2015
Notes Number of cases: AT: 1441, GB: 3785, DE: 2596, FR: 1675, NL: 3222, CH: 2241. Source
see the information under Fig. 5.4
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contrast, socio-cultural professionals and managers were consistently less
against immigration than the average respondent. Socio-cultural profes-
sionals generally displayed the most favourable position on immigration.
When focusing the cross-time comparison on popular votes on immi-
gration in Switzerland, production workers had not become more anti-
immigrant over time. The class structure that we could observe for
the 1970s—with socio-cultural professionals and production workers
occupying two distinct positions on this axis—had not changed. More
systematically, using ratios to check changes in the average position on
immigration, we can even conclude that class differences in immigration
had become smaller over time.
For the other countries, the comparison leads to another conclusion.
Relative to the average citizen, production workers had become more
distinctively opposed to immigration over time. If one compares produc-
tion workers to managers, there is an increasing divergence between the
two classes on immigration issues. However, there is more stability if one
compares production workers to socio-cultural professionals, as the latter
had also become less strongly pro-immigration over time.
This divergence in cross-time comparisons between Switzerland and
the other countries is not entirely surprising. The survey questions are
different, as is the degree of politicisation of migration issues. The popular
votes in Switzerland were the early outcome of agenda-setting strategies
by radical right parties. In the other countries, migration was less an issue
on the political agenda at the time, although one should not forget early
attempts to deploy an anti-immigration discourse in several countries,
such as in Great Britain around the Conservative shadow cabinet member
Enoch Powell (see Schofield 2012).
Finally, it is possible to gain a finer view by examining different
subgroups (see Table 5.1). Restricting the sample to those who voted
for a social democratic/socialist/Labour Party in the last election gener-
ally decreases the opposition to immigration. The same is also true if
we restrict the sample to social democratic supporters who were produc-
tion workers—this is important to underline. However, within the social
democratic electorate, class differences remained and production workers
continued to display a relatively stronger anti-immigration position than
the average social democratic voter. Again, if we consider workers who
had not participated in the last election (and thus who might at some
point again vote for social democracy), we observe that they were rela-
tively more opposed to immigration than the average non-voter in all
84 L. RENNWALD
Table 5.1 Average position of workers by party choice on the anti-immigration
scale—2010–2015
AT GB DE FR NL CH
Social democratic voters Workers 0.58 0.55 0.44 0.57 0.45 0.46
Total 0.51 0.45 0.38 0.46 0.39 0.33
Radical Right voters Workers 0.67 0.61 0.51 0.79 0.60 0.55
Total 0.67 0.59 0.53 0.73 0.59 0.55
Non-voters Workers 0.67 0.59 0.55 0.62 0.50 0.47
Total 0.61 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.48 0.45
Note Scores in bold indicate a difference equal to or higher than 0.05 between workers and the
electorate of the given party. Number of cases: AT: 145-310, GB: 99-915, DE: 95-519, FR: 123-438,
NL: 257-568, CH: 233-678. Source see the information under Fig. 5.4
the countries—but the difference was small for the Netherlands and
Switzerland. Finally, if one isolates voters for radical right parties,4 class
differences were almost absent. Production workers who voted for radical
right parties were very much aligned with the position of the average
radical right voter, with the exception of France.
Summing Up
In a first step, this chapter has reviewed major trends in social democracy’s
political project. In recent decades, one can observe both an increasing
accommodation to market forces by social democratic parties and an
increasing salience of new issues on their political agenda. By substantially
revising their original political project, social democratic parties there-
fore contributed to a demobilisation of workers on the socio-economic
dimension of the political space. At the same time, social democratic
parties faced a more difficult context to develop class-based mobilisation.
Populist radical right parties started to mobilise workers for a political
project with a restriction of immigration at its core.
In a second step, the chapter has analysed attitudes among social
classes on redistribution and immigration issues. It has demonstrated that
workers display a particular combination of political attitudes: on the
one hand, they support redistribution more than average; on the other
hand, they are more than average opponents of immigration. Most impor-
tantly, the chapter has demonstrated that this combination of attitudes
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was already present in the 1970s. This was especially the case in Switzer-
land, where immigration issues were present on the political agenda very
early.
The contrast between changes in parties’ political supply and voters’
demands that has been at the centre of this chapter indicates that trans-
formations in the former are more important than transformations in
the latter. Hence, the ways in which parties propose political choices
to workers are crucial to understand workers’ new voting patterns. The
demobilisation of class by social democracy went along with a new mobil-
isation of nationality by populist radical right parties. Hence, these two
changes constitute two sides of the same coin. The result is that social
class became less relevant for voting behaviour, but more relevant for
abstention.
Notes
1. I restrict the analysis to four countries for this period because of a lack of
data for France. The results for this country in the 1980s indicate a similar
configuration of preferences.
2. In the survey, respondents are confronted with political issues and then for
each political issue asked the importance of the problem, the government’s
responsibility for dealing with the problem and the performance of the
government in handling the problem. One political issue concerns wealth
differences.
3. I select the question on the importance of the problem of according the
same rights to migrants. Using the question on government responsibility
leads to similar conclusions about class differences.
4. One should be cautious in the interpretation of the findings for Great
Britain and Germany since the number of radical right voters in the survey
is particularly low.
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CHAPTER 6
Renewing Social Democracy by Re-mobilising
theWorking Class?
Abstract This chapter concludes by summarising the main results of the
book. It closes with a discussion on the renewal of social democracy and
reviews current proposals and experiences. With this aim, it evaluates the
role of the working class in social democracy’s future electoral strategies.
It discusses the risks for social democracy in abandoning the workers’ vote
and examines some factors that would facilitate the electoral mobilisation
of workers in the future. Based on current debates on the future of social
democracy, it then reviews possible ideological reorientations of social
democracy and evaluates their chances of success among its (potential)
supporters.
Keywords Social democracy · Electoral strategies · Trade unions ·
Service workers · Mobilisation · Immigration
Fragmentation in the Working-Class
Vote and the De-proletarianisation
of Social Democracy
The empirical analyses conducted in Chapters 3 and 4 examined the
class basis of social democratic parties at two different time points, the
first one in the 1970s and the second one in the 2010s. The two time
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points are representative of two different periods for social democracy,
one in which social democracy achieved strong electoral successes and
one in which it suffered electoral defeats. The book has shown how
the relationship between social democratic parties and their working-class
constituency has strongly changed between the two periods. The anal-
ysis on the 1970s conducted in Chapter 3 showed the existence of a
relatively strong proximity between production workers and social demo-
cratic parties in electoral contests. Production workers voted clearly more
than average for social democratic parties and they represented a large
share of their electorate. In Chapter 4, all the indicators pointed towards
a decomposition of this specific relationship. In the 2010s, production
workers were much less distinctive in their support for social democracy
and they clearly represented a smaller share of its electorate. Moreover,
production workers were much more likely to abstain from voting in
the 2010s. Importantly, the transformation of social democracy’s rela-
tionship with the working class was not only a question of structural
change with workers representing a smaller share of the total electorate.
The effect of structural change on social democracy was clearly reinforced
by a weakening support on the part of workers.
As a result, the working-class vote has become more complex and
above all more fragmented. While they enjoyed some kind of monopoly
over the working-class vote in the 1970s, social democratic parties now
face competition on multiple fronts. One cannot reduce the new voting
patterns to a choice between social democratic and radical right parties,
as is often suggested in public discourse. Abstention is nowadays a funda-
mental characteristic of working-class voting behaviour. The decision for
workers nowadays is not only a choice between different parties but
first and foremost a choice between abstention and voting. Then, social
democracy competes with both the radical left and the radical right, while
mainstream right parties also capture an important share of the working-
class vote. However, workers are not more likely than the average voter
to support the mainstream right, while the opposite is clearly the case for
radical left and radical right parties. The contest from the left of social
democracy for the workers’ vote is not something new. However, the
presence of challengers to the left of social democracy has expanded in
several countries in recent decades. Among the countries studied, only
the French party system in the 1970s was distinctive in this respect, with
a relatively strong Communist Party. In the 2010s, next to France, radical
left parties in Germany and the Netherlands also attracted some shares of
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the workers’ vote. Moreover, competition from the centre or the right
for the working-class vote is also not really new. However, the rivalry has
significantly expanded to more countries. In the 1970s, Christian Demo-
cratic parties constituted sizeable challengers for the working-class vote in
just a few countries. Nowadays, the capture of working-class vote shares
by radical right parties concerns all countries. Hence, social democracy
only faced competition for the working-class vote in specific contexts in
the 1970s but nowadays fighting on multiple fronts represents the normal
case for it.
The consequence of the new voting patterns is clearly a weakening
of the status of social democracy as working-class parties. However,
the book has conceived the trajectory of social democracy in a more
refined way than previous research. First, as Chapter 3 showed, even if
there was a strong connexion between workers and social democracy,
it would be wrong to understand social democracy in the 1970s as a
purely working-class movement. Instead of conceptualising social demo-
cratic parties as ‘pure working-class parties’, the book has shown that
social democratic parties are closer to the ideal type of ‘hybrid working-
class parties’, with a strong mobilisation of production workers co-existing
with an intermediate mobilisation of lower white-collar workers. Second,
as was discussed in Chapter 4, it would be imprecise to characterise social
democratic/socialist/labour parties in the 2010s as parties of the (new)
middle classes. In many countries, social democratic parties are closer to
cross-class parties, where no social class presents a particularly high level
of support and where the composition of their electorate mirrors the
composition of the eligible population. Hence, instead of emphasising
a shift from the working class to the middle class, the trajectory implies a
transformation from hybrid working-class parties to cross-class parties.
Examination of the changing voting patterns has also revealed strong
cross-national variation. In countries where the class cleavage was more
dominant and no serious competitor for the working-class vote was
present, the mobilisation of workers was more important in the 1970s
than in countries with competition for the working-class vote. One
can observe that social democracy/labour in Austria and Great Britain
mobilised the working-class vote the most and relied less on other classes
in the 1970s, while in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, the
mobilisation was less strong and social democracy relied more on other
classes. France was clearly an exception, with a strong cross-class profile
of the French Socialist Party’s electorate, and the party faced competition
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from the Communist Party. There is important path dependency in the
working-class mobilisation of social democracy. In countries that relied
more heavily on the working-class vote, the demobilisation of workers led
them to become more clearly cross-class parties in the 2010s. In coun-
tries that already relied more on the vote from other segments, there was
a higher proximity to the ideal type of new class parties in the 2010s.
There was again some opposition between Austria and Great Britain on
the one hand, and Switzerland and the Netherlands on the other hand.
Historically smaller social democratic parties have therefore followed
a different path than historically larger social democratic parties. They
have regenerated their electorate—either strategically or unintentionally—
by turning more explicitly to the new middle classes, which were already
closer to social democracy. It is also no coincidence that the structure of
the electorate is less predominantly working class in these countries. To
some extent, social democratic parties have been responsive to the struc-
ture of the electorate. However, this does not mean that they have been
more successful at the ballot box. In the 1970s, the Swiss Social Demo-
cratic Party received almost 25% of the vote, but in the 2010s it did not
achieve more than 19% (and even reached a historical low of 16.8% in the
2019 election). The scores of the Dutch Labour Party oscillated between
a quarter and a third of the votes in the 1970s decade. In the 2010s, it
never reached more than a quarter of the vote (with a disastrous score of
5.7% in 2017). This suggests that there is not a winning formula whereby
‘new class parties’ find an easier way to electoral success than ‘cross-class
parties’. This suggests that the remedies are different from one case to
the next. Importantly, one should take this cross-national variation into
account when one thinks about the potential ways for social democracy to
renew its electoral success. The composition of the electorate can be rela-
tively different from one case to the next, and renewing the confidence of
the working class does not mean the same (and does not have the same
implications) in each context.
Continuity in Preferences;
Changes in Parties’ Political Offers
Chapter 5 examined possible explanations of the growing distance
between workers and social democratic/labour parties. It contrasted
explanations that focus on the demand side of politics with ones that
concentrate on the supply side. On the one hand, it investigated the
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political attitudes of workers and social classes; on the other hand, it
considered major trends in parties’ political projects in recent decades.
The results suggest that changes in the way parties mobilise their elec-
torates are more important than changes in workers’ political attitudes.
Transformations in parties’ political offers have produced a smaller like-
lihood of workers being mobilised on the basis of their social class, and
by extension, a greater likelihood of them being mobilised on competing
cleavages. Social democratic parties have contributed to a demobilisation
of social class by revising their original political project and adopting
a more friendly position towards the market in most European coun-
tries. They also responded to societal demands in the domain of cultural
liberalism in the aftermath of the post-1968 social movements. This
contributed again to mobilising other identities, for example gender, but
not social class in a strict sense. Meanwhile, other actors have entered the
political arena and sought to mobilise workers on the basis of competing
identities. This is particularly the case of radical right parties, which have
put forward an anti-immigration agenda aimed at creating new divisions
among workers based on nationality. This political agenda stands, there-
fore, in strong contrast to the idea of international class solidarity that is
historically at the core of the labour movement.
Examination of workers’ and social classes’ political attitudes has shown
a pattern of stability over time, at least in comparison with what can be
considered a major reversal in the way parties appeal to social classes or
other identities. First, on socio-economic issues, workers have consistently
demanded more redistribution than the average respondent, both in the
1970s and in the 2010s. Although the differences between classes are
not always very strong, there is a clear class pattern with (production
or service) workers being more in favour of redistribution and managers
being less in favour of redistribution. This continuity in the preferences
of workers suggests that a lower position in the social structure trans-
lates more or less directly into a demand for redistribution. However, one
must also notice the pro-redistributive attitudes of socio-cultural profes-
sionals. Being a member of the salaried middle classes (and hence being
located in a higher position in the social structure in comparison with
workers) does not imply by definition an opposition to redistribution.
Instead, the results indicate divisions within the broad category of the
salaried middle classes. This also suggests a real potential to develop new
coalitions between workers and segments of the salaried middle classes on
redistribution issues.
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Second, on socio-cultural issues, workers display a more critical stance
towards immigration than the salaried middle classes. The results on the
Swiss case, where immigration was strongly debated in the arena of direct
democracy in the 1970s, indicate a strong continuity in the sceptical
stance of workers towards immigration. Interestingly, anti-immigration
positions (in the arena of direct democracy) were compatible with support
for social democracy (in the electoral arena) at the time in this country.
The results for the other countries indicate that workers have become
more sceptical towards immigration over time. However, one should
remain cautious about this finding, given that the questions available
referred more to the integration of migrants in the 1970s and less to
a general evaluation of migration, as in the 2010s.
Overall, our results suggest that the ways parties have transformed their
political projects (and therefore their appeals to the different preferences
of workers and social classes) are important to understand changes in
voting patterns. Analysis of political attitudes indicates that demands from
social classes display a strong continuity over time. The preferences of
workers still tilt towards social democratic policies in the socio-economic
realm. However, social democracy has been less concerned with the goal
of redistribution in recent decades. Moreover, the preferences of workers
tilt towards the agenda of radical right parties in the domain of immigra-
tion policies. Given the high salience of migration issues in contemporary
politics, social democratic parties objectively face more difficulties in
mobilising workers on the socio-economic dimension—independently of
their own transformations on these issues.
After having presented the main results of this book, the rest of this
conclusion turns to possible attempts to re-mobilise the working class for
a social democratic project. It also reviews different ideological reorienta-
tions and their effects on working-class mobilisation. More generally, the
rest of the conclusion questions the future of social democracy and the
different paths it can choose.
Should Workers Be Mobilised at All?
Disagreements about social democracy’s future electoral strategies often
concern the emphasis that should be placed on the (re-)mobilisation
of the working-class vote. Based on the observed transformation of its
voters’ class composition, it may be tempting to argue that regaining the
working-class vote is not a worthwhile project for social democracy. In
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this perspective, winning again the workers’ vote is a task too difficult,
and above all is not likely to contribute decisively to social democracy’s
vote share. A better strategy would therefore be to concentrate efforts
fully on the new middle classes, which represent growing segments of
the electorate. From this point of view, the advantage would also be in
avoiding dilemmas that originate from the divergent preferences of social
democracy’s electorate on socio-cultural issues (e.g. on immigration, as
was shown in Chapter 5). Giving priority to mobilising the new middle
classes, which have a (uniform) liberal position on cultural issues, elimi-
nates the difficulties for social democracy in finding policy positions that
are suitable for different constituencies.
The book has demonstrated, however, the continuing importance of
the working class—if one is willing to enlarge its contours. This presup-
poses a disposition to observe transformations in political economies and
to adjust the representation of the working class to occupations such
as shop assistants, hairdressers and delivery drivers. Clearly, production
workers have become a smaller segment of the population entitled to
vote, but if one defines both production and service workers as being
part of the working class, the picture changes dramatically. The enlarged
working class represents a noticeable share of the entire electorate. As was
shown in Chapter 4 of this book, the enlarged working class represents
between 40 and 45% of the entire electorate in three countries in our
sample (Austria, France and Great Britain) and between 30 and 35% in
three other countries (Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland). It is
only in these latter countries that the new middle classes represent a larger
proportion of the eligible electorate.
Of course, the new service proletariat represents a difficult constituency
to mobilise. Social democratic parties can rely less on trade union allies
to reach this electoral segment. It must be remembered here that union
members are more likely to take part in elections (e.g. Flavin and Radcliff
2011) and when then do they are more likely to support left-wing parties
(e.g. Arndt and Rennwald 2016; Mosimann et al. 2019). Union density in
low-end private services remains lower than in the manufacturing sector in
advanced industrial countries at the end of the 2010s (Pontusson 2013:
802–803). On average, service workers are active in establishments of
smaller size and there is a large diffusion of atypical employment. These
two factors are strongly associated with a lower propensity to unionise
(Pontusson 2013). Isolation at work, which is widespread among certain
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categories of service workers (e.g. in cleaning or security), also depresses
electoral participation (Peugny 2015).
Among production workers, the prospects are also bleak with respect
to unionisation. In the same study, Pontusson observes significant declines
in the manufacturing sector in almost all countries from the 1980s to the
end of the 2000s. These relate to the decentralisation of production and
the spread of atypical employment in manufacturing (2013: 802–803).
This explains partly, at least, why social democratic parties nowadays face
more problems in mobilising their traditional constituencies.
A look at history is probably useful here. We may be too much
informed by the decades following the Second World War, when the
organisations of the labour movement were relatively powerful and when
it was relatively easy or normal to mobilise workers. The comparison
should instead switch to the turn of the nineteenth century, a time
in which labour movement organisations were in their early days, and
workers were hesitant about socialist ideas and divided across skills and
origins. It was therefore one of the main achievements of the labour
movement to develop some degree of unity and class awareness among
very diverse segments of the workforce through the diffusion of socialist
ideas and the development of a broad network of organisations (see
Moschonas 2002: 28–30; Sassoon 1996: 7–8). In recent years, new
attempts to forge unity among the fragmented working class can be
observed, reminding us of the early days of the labour movement. Trade
unions have intensified their efforts to organise the new service proletariat
and, more generally, to become more inclusive towards workers with atyp-
ical employment contracts (e.g. Benassi and Vlandas 2016; Doellgast et al.
2018, Rathgeb 2018; Rieger et al. 2012). However, these new attempts
to forge unity will require numerous years of work—a calendar that is
different to that of party strategists focusing on maximising vote shares in
a brief period of time.
How Should Workers Be Mobilised?
As Cas Mudde (2019) emphasises, several politicians and leaders from
social democratic parties have advocated for stricter immigration poli-
cies when their parties have been confronted with electoral decline. The
reason that is invoked is often similar from one social democratic party
to the next. As Mudde explains, social democratic parties perceive the
loss of the working class to the radical right as the main cause of their
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electoral decline, and the remedy is a defence of a more restrictive immi-
gration agenda. However, this book has clearly demonstrated that voting
for radical right parties represents only one option among others for
workers in contemporary politics. Hence, as Mudde argues in the same
article, it would be wrong to assume that the electoral rise of radical right
parties is caused by working-class voters abandoning social democratic
parties. The book has shown an important diversity in the new voting
choices of workers—and therefore an important fragmentation of the
working-class vote. Of course, a significant de-proletarianisation of the
electorate for social democracy has occured. Simultaneously, there is an
undeniable process of proletarianisation of the electorate for the radical
right. However, other transformations have been underlined. First and
foremost, there is a large proletarianisation of the group of abstainers.
Second, radical left parties and, to some extent, mainstream right parties
also attract shares of the working-class vote.
Interestingly, when considering how to re-capture the working-class
vote, being tougher on immigration is often represented as the only solu-
tion by pundits or politicians from social democracy. Such a position goes
hand in hand with the flourishing of stereotypes about the working class
and the growing association of it in public discourse with a group of
angry and uneducated citizens. It is interesting to note that aspirations
for redistribution—in Chapter 5 we observed the support for redistri-
bution among workers—are entirely absent from the discussions. In this
respect, it appears necessary to reframe the terms of the debate. One
must remember the broader transformation of social democracy on socio-
economic issues with extensive revisions of its political project. One must
also remember that social democracy was always more liberal on the socio-
cultural dimension than Conservatives, Christian Democrats and even
mainstream liberal parties. Even if one focuses on the position of social
democracy on cultural liberalism and immigration, one should not forget
the transformation at the core of social democracy’s political project.
This means on issues related to the role of the state in the economy
and redistribution. If the traditional functions of social democracy on the
socio-economic dimension are neglected, it becomes difficult to convince
voters to support this party family on the basis of cultural issues. Isolating
the cultural positions of social democracy from its economic positions
therefore misses an essential part of the story.
Having made this clarification, one must nonetheless observe that
issues related to immigration and European integration represent an
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important challenge for social democracy—and generally for mainstream
parties (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2018), especially when they are very
salient on the political agenda. One must therefore think about the best
ways for social democracy to face the saliency of these issues. In an
article published in 2010, Tim Bale and other co-authors (Bale et al.
2010) discussed several options for social democratic parties when they
are confronted with the rise of radical right parties in the policy domain
of immigration. They can try to stick to a strong pro-immigrant view,
they can try to advocate stricter immigration policies, or they can try to
avoid the issue of immigration and contribute to decreasing the salience
of immigration overall. The last two options have been the most discussed
and (partially) implemented by social democratic parties in recent years.
Adopting a stricter immigration policy poses several problems for social
democracy. First, it is in contrast to the ideological core of social democ-
racy based on internationalism and class solidarity. A move towards the
defence of the ‘white’ working class would represent an enormous shift in
the history of the labour movement—of similar magnitude to the third-
way turn of social democracy. Second, this would pose some electoral
problems. Advocating more restrictive policies would contain the risk
of alienating segments of the middle classes that are in favour of pro-
immigration policies (see Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020). Moreover, one
should also not forget that the working class often has a migration back-
ground—reducing the working class to the white working class would
therefore be an important mistake.
Among the various social democratic parties (or leaders) in Europe
that have either considered or endorsed a stricter position on immigra-
tion (see Mudde 2019), the Danish Social Democrats campaigned the
most explicitly on an anti-migration position in the recent 2019 elec-
tion, following a new paper adopted in 2018 (see Nedergaard 2018). The
Social Democrats led by Mette Frederiksen were the clear winners of this
election and returned to office with a minority government. The harsh
line defended by the party on immigration was prominently discussed in
the media as a major reason for its electoral success. However, there are
two reasons to remain cautious about Danish Social Democracy being a
new model for its sister parties. First, the Social Democrats did not achieve
a particularly high vote share—instead they slightly dropped from 26.3%
in the last election to 25.9%.1 Second, it is difficult to isolate the effect of
migration, since the Social Democrats under the new leadership also kept
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their distance from the third way and emphasised a more classical social
democratic agenda on socio-economic issues (e.g. Møller Stahl 2019).
Another strategy could be to avoid talking about immigration (this
could also apply to European integration) and instead increase the saliency
of socio-economic issues. This strategy clearly speaks to the commonalities
of workers and segments of the salaried middle classes on redistributive
issues, as was shown in Chapter 5 of this book. In contrast, these groups
have more diverging preferences on immigration issues. It is therefore
relatively wise to concentrate party statements on issues where there is
agreement between the diverse segments of the (potential) electoral base
and to try to decrease the attention on issues where there is a strong
disagreement. To some extent, this was the strategy adopted by Jeremy
Corbyn after the 2016 Brexit referendum. Given the divergent positions
on Brexit within the Labour Party voter base, it was logical to focus
attention on issues where constituencies share similar views. Moreover,
Corbyn’s project was to reorient the Labour Party towards a more clas-
sical left-wing economic policy agenda. Hence, giving priority to the fight
against austerity and the rebuilding of the National Health Service over
discussions about Britain’s relationship with the EU appeared relatively
consequential from this point of view. When Brexit was not at the centre
of the electoral campaign, as was the case in 2017, this strategy offered
Labour a relatively high score (40% of the vote share, the highest score
since the 2001 general election). However, when Brexit dominated the
electoral campaign and was in the mind of many voters, as was the case in
2019, the approach led to a strong Labour defeat, above all in terms of
seats—the weakest score since 1935. Hence, such a strategy is relatively
risky and its success depends on the capacity of social democracy to focus
the attention in the entire electoral campaign on economic issues.
None of these solutions therefore appear ideal for social democracy.
One should therefore think whether the future of social democracy
is closely connected to another option: integrating the economic and
cultural dimensions better in its political project. Instead of emphasising
socio-economic issues to the detriment of socio-cultural issues, instead
of a strong disentanglement of the two dimensions, the most impor-
tant task for social democracy would be to better show how the two
are strongly connected. This would allow the different preferences of
its heterogeneous electorate to be respected. Hence, to some extent,
Social Democrats need to reframe the new cultural issues in their own
ideology. They must therefore propose a socio-economic translation of
100 L. RENNWALD
cultural problems, as the radical right has been able to offer a socio-
cultural translation of economic conflict in recent decades. In doing
so, social democracy can aim to again fulfil its historical role of inte-
grating the working class into democratic politics and hence to increase
its representation in the party system overall.
Note
1. They could count on important gains by the Danish Social Liberal Party
and the Socialist People’s Party to receive support for their minority
government.
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cabinets in modern democracies.
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